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INTRODUCTION
Since 2009, Donald J. Trump has maintained a personal account on Twitter, a
social media platform, using the “handle” @realDonaldTrump. Like many of
Twitter’s more than 300 million active users, Donald Trump uses his Twitter account
as a means of communicating his own views to interested members of the public. For
nearly a decade, he has used that account to convey his thoughts on a wide variety of
topics, ranging from popular culture to world affairs. Since becoming President, he
has continued to use that account in the same way. In contrast to the official Twitter
accounts of the President of the United States and the White House, which belong to
the federal government, the @realDonaldTrump account belongs to him personally
and will remain his account after he leaves office.
During his presidency, Donald Trump has chosen to block a limited number of
Twitter users from his personal Twitter account, including the individual plaintiffs in
this case. Blocking primarily limits the ability of the blocked user to interact with
Donald Trump on his account, such as by preventing the user from replying directly
to Donald Trump’s tweets or retweeting them. The district court in this case ruled
that when Donald Trump blocks other Twitter users from his personal Twitter
account, in response to tweets criticizing him or his policies, he is violating the First
Amendment by denying the blocked users access to a public forum. That ruling is
fundamentally misconceived.
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The constitutional right of a private individual to express his or her views in a
public forum comes into play only when the property in question is owned or
controlled by the government and the individual’s exclusion from that property is the
product of state action. But here, the @realDonaldTrump account belongs to
Donald Trump in his personal capacity and is subject to his personal control, not the
control of the government. And when he exercises the power enjoyed by all Twitter
users to block other users from their own accounts, he is not using any authority
belonging to or conferred on him by the federal government.
The district court nevertheless concluded that the @realDonaldTrump account
has become government-controlled property because Donald Trump now uses it to
make statements about official matters and advocate the policies of his administration.
But a government officer’s personal property is not transformed into governmentcontrolled property for purposes of the First Amendment merely because he makes
public statements on it, and such statements likewise do not limit his ability to
exercise his personal, not governmental, authority to exclude people from his own
property. If, for example, John F. Kennedy gave an official speech at his family
compound at Hyannis Port, opened it up to a public audience, and allowed them to
comment afterward, it plainly would not violate the First Amendment for him to
exclude certain members of the public from his own property because they had
previously criticized him. And what is true for real property is just as true for
intangible property in the form of a personal Twitter account.
2
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Nor is the @realDonaldTrump account a “forum” for public expression.
Donald Trump uses it not to provide a platform for public discussion, but to
disseminate his own views to the world. When he blocks a particular user from
reading or replying to his tweets, he is exercising his right to choose with whom he
will engage in speech. Nothing in the First Amendment divests him of that
prerogative or compels him to receive messages that he does not wish to hear.
Blocked users remain free to express their views to other Twitter users through their
own Twitter accounts; the First Amendment does not entitle them to piggyback on
Donald Trump’s speech to amplify their own.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiffs are asserting constitutional claims against defendants and invoked the
district court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. On May 23, 2018, the district
court entered a final order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part
and granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in part and denying it in part.
Dkt. No. 72. Defendants filed a timely notice of appeal on June 4, 2018. A440; Fed.
R. App. P. 4(a)(1). This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether Donald Trump’s blocking of the individual plaintiffs from his
personal Twitter account violates the First Amendment.

3
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal arises from a suit brought by seven Twitter users (the “individual
plaintiffs”) whom Donald J. Trump has blocked from interacting with his personal
Twitter account, @realDonaldTrump, and by the Knight First Amendment Institute
at Columbia University (“Knight Institute”). Plaintiffs sued Donald Trump, in his
capacity as President of the United States; Daniel Scavino, Assistant to the President
and White House Social Media Director; and two other members of the White House
staff, alleging that the decision to block these users violated the First Amendment. In
May 2018, Judge Naomi Buchwald issued an order granting summary judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs with respect to defendants Donald Trump and Daniel Scavino,
and dismissing the remaining defendants from the case. Knight First Amendment Inst. at
Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Judge Buchwald issued
a declaratory judgment that the blocking of the individual plaintiffs from the
@realDonaldTrump account violated the First Amendment.
A.

The Twitter Social Media Platform

Twitter is a privately owned and operated social media platform that allows its
“users”—businesses or members of the public who have created an account on the
platform and agreed to Twitter’s terms of service—to post short messages known as
“tweets.” Stipulation ¶¶ 14, 17 (A45, A48). Users may also repost or reply to other

4
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users’ messages, and may interact with other Twitter users in relation to those
messages. Id. ¶¶ 21-23 (A49-A50).1
When individuals create accounts on Twitter, they create a unique identifier (or
“handle”) for their account and are given a webpage (sometimes called a “timeline”)
that is associated with that account. Stipulation ¶¶ 15-16 (A46-A47). From that
account, users can tweet short messages that appear on their timeline in reverse
chronological order. See id. ¶ 15, 17 (A46-A48). By default, Twitter timelines are
visible to everyone with internet access, including those who are not Twitter users. Id.
¶ 18 (A48).
In addition to allowing its users to post tweets on their own webpages, Twitter
enables users to interact with each other in a variety of ways. Users can “favorite” or
“like” another user’s tweet by clicking on a heart icon that appears under the tweet.
Stipulation ¶ 24 (A51). Users can also “mention” another user by including the other
user’s Twitter handle in a tweet. Id. ¶ 25 (A52). A Twitter user mentioned by another
user will receive a notification that he or she has been mentioned in the other user’s
tweet. Id. And users may “follow” other users, which enables them to receive
notifications every time that other user posts a tweet. Id. ¶ 19 (A48).

At the time the stipulation was filed, tweets, replies, and retweets were limited
to a total of 140 characters. Stipulation ¶ 14 (A45). Twitter has since changed its
policy and expanded that limit to 280 characters.
5
1
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A user may reply directly to another user’s tweet. When a user replies to a
tweet, the reply appears on the user’s own timeline under a tab labeled “Tweets &
replies.” Stipulation ¶ 22 (A49-A50). A reply tweet may be as long as any other
tweet, and can be replied to in turn by other users. Id. Replies are visible not only on
the Twitter page of the replying user, but may also be accessed from the original user’s
timeline. Id. ¶ 23 (A50-A51). Anyone who clicks on an original tweet will see a
collection of any replies, with replies-to-replies nested below the replies to which they
respond. Id.
Users may also “retweet”—i.e., repost—the tweets of other users, either by
posting them directly to their own followers or by “quoting” them in their own
tweets. Id. ¶ 21 (A49). When a user retweets a tweet, it appears on the user’s timeline
in the same form as it did on the original user’s timeline, but with a notation
indicating that the post was retweeted. Id. The same is true when a user quotes a
tweet, except that the user may add commentary above the image of the original
tweet.
In addition to allowing its users to interact with each other, Twitter gives users
several means to limit others from interacting with them. First, users may “protect”
their accounts. When an account is protected, the user’s tweets are not visible to the
general public, and may be seen (and replied to) only by those users that the account
owner has affirmatively approved. Stipulation ¶ 27 (A52). Second, if account owners
do not wish to prevent the public from seeing their tweets, but want to limit their
6
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interactions with particular users, they may choose to “block” individual users’
accounts. Id. ¶ 28 (A52). The dispute in this case relates to this blocking feature.
While logged into a blocked account, a user cannot see the blocking user’s
tweets or use the Twitter platform to search for those tweets. Stipulation ¶ 28 (A52).
However, the blocked user can continue to view the blocking user’s tweets by using
an internet browser or other application that is not logged in to the blocked Twitter
account. Id. ¶¶ 31, 55 (A54, A63-A64). Blocking also prevents the blocked user from
retweeting or replying to a blocking user’s tweets. Id. ¶ 28 (A52). Blocked users
nevertheless can respond to the blocking user’s tweets by posting responsive tweets
on their own Twitter pages and can mention the blocking user in those tweets, but the
blocking user will not be notified of such tweets. Id. In addition, a blocked user can
reply to other users’ replies to the blocking user’s tweets. Id. ¶ 30 (A53-A54). These
replies-to-replies will appear in the collection of replies beneath the blocking users’
tweet. Id. Blocked users may also take screenshots of a tweet or reply and post a
picture of that tweet to their own timeline with whatever commentary they would
have included in a direct reply. Id. ¶ 55 (A63-A64).
Finally, users may “mute” other users. Muted users continue to see all of the
muting user’s tweets while logged into their own accounts, and they may retweet and
reply to those tweets. How to mute accounts on Twitter, Twitter,
https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/twitter-mute (last visited July 24, 2018).
However, unless the muting user follows the muted account, he will not receive
7
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notifications when the muted user replies or mentions the muting user, and replies by
the muted user will be invisible to the muting user if he clicks on the tweets that
originated those replies. Id. Similarly, if an account that has not been muted quotes
or retweets a tweet from an account that has been muted, the quoted tweet will be
hidden from the muting user with a “This Tweet is unavailable” message. Id.
All of the features described above are part of the platform set up by Twitter
and agreed to by users when they sign the terms of service. See generally Twitter Terms of
Service, Twitter, https://twitter.com/en/tos (last visited July 24, 2018). A Twitter user
cannot choose to have an account that has a subset of these features; for example, a
user cannot obtain from Twitter an account that prohibits certain other users from
blocking them.
B.

Donald Trump’s Personal Twitter Account

Donald Trump established his personal Twitter account, @realDonaldTrump,
in March 2009. Stipulation ¶ 32 (A54). The account is not protected, meaning that
any member of the public can view his tweets without his approval and even without
having a Twitter account. Id. ¶ 36 (A55).
Before assuming the Presidency in January 2017, Donald Trump used his
account to tweet about a variety of topics, including popular culture and politics.
Stipulation ¶ 32 (A54). He has continued to use the @realDonaldTrump account
since his inauguration. Id. Through it, he communicates with the public through
statements about official matters and other comments about his administration,
8

Case 18-1691, Document 25, 08/07/2018, 2362018, Page15 of 124

opines on public events, and also continues to post purely personal tweets unrelated
to government policies and issues. See id.
In certain instances, Donald Trump enlists the assistance of Daniel Scavino, an
Assistant to the President, in posting tweets to the @realDonaldTrump account.
Stipulation ¶ 38 (A56). The President and the White House also operate two
government Twitter accounts: @POTUS and @WhiteHouse. Id. ¶ 45 (A60).
Between May and June 2017, Donald Trump blocked Twitter accounts
belonging to the seven individual plaintiffs from his personal Twitter account.
Stipulation ¶¶ 46-52 (A60-A62). Each of the individual plaintiffs had posted a reply
to an @realDonaldTrump tweet shortly before being blocked. Id. The replies
generally expressed displeasure with the President, in some cases with inflammatory
language. See, e.g., id. ¶ 47 (A60-A61) (reply calling him a “Corrupt Incompetent
Authoritarian”).
By blocking the individual plaintiffs, Donald Trump prevented them from
directly interacting with him on Twitter. The blocked plaintiffs cannot view
@realDonaldTrump tweets while logged into their accounts or retweet or directly
reply to those tweets. Stipulation ¶ 54 (A62-A63). Plaintiffs can, however, view
tweets posted by @realDonaldTrump when not logged into their blocked accounts,
or when logged into any other unblocked accounts they have. Id. ¶¶ 55, 56 (A63A64). Blocking the plaintiffs does not prevent them from interacting with others on
Twitter or from continuing to criticize Donald Trump or his administration on that
9
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platform. Even while logged in to their blocked accounts, plaintiffs may mention
@realDonaldTrump in their own tweets, and may post screenshots of
@realDonaldTrump tweets with their own commentary. See id. ¶¶ 28, 55 (A52, A63).
They may also view reply tweets posted in response to @realDonaldTrump tweets,
and can post replies to those replies. Id. ¶ 57 (A64). Those replies-to-replies appear
in the collections of replies beneath @realDonaldTrump tweets for all to see. Id.
Indeed, all but one of the individual plaintiffs have, despite being blocked,
participated in conversations with other Twitter users by replying to replies to
@realDonaldTrump tweets. Id. ¶ 58 (A65-A66).
C.

Procedural Background
1. Complaint and Motions for Summary Judgment

In July 2017, the individual plaintiffs and the Knight Institute filed this civil
action against Donald Trump, Daniel Scavino, and two other White House staff
members. Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Donald Trump’s decision to
block the individual plaintiffs from the @realDonaldTrump account. A16-A40. They
sought a declaration that blocking the individual plaintiffs was unconstitutional and an
injunction requiring the defendants to unblock the individual plaintiffs. A39-A40.
The parties entered a stipulation of facts and cross-moved for summary judgment on
the basis of the stipulation. See A41-A42 (Joint Letter Motion for Leave to file
Stipulation); A43-A67 (Joint Stipulation); A68-A71 (Joint Notice of Filing Exhibits to
Stipulation); A72-A364 (Exhibits to Stipulation).
10
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Among other things, the parties stipulated that the @realDonaldTrump
account was created in March 2009, long before Donald Trump’s inauguration.
Stipulation ¶ 32 (A54). The parties further stipulated that the @realDonaldTrump
account has been used since the inauguration to announce matters related to official
government business, but that Donald Trump also continues to use the account to
communicate about issues entirely unrelated to government business. Id. ¶¶ 32, 38
(A54, A56). The stipulation provides that, for the purpose of this litigation, the
defendants do not contest that the individual plaintiffs had been blocked from
@realDonaldTrump because they had posted tweets that criticized Donald Trump or
his policies, A43.
Based on the stipulations, the plaintiffs claimed that Donald Trump’s decision
to block the individual plaintiffs from his personal Twitter account constitutes a
viewpoint-based restriction on access to a public forum and access to official
statements. The plaintiffs based that claim on the First Amendment’s public forum
doctrine, which concerns the circumstances in which the government may restrict
private access for expressive purposes to property that it owns or controls. Plaintiffs
also claimed that the decision imposes a viewpoint-based restriction on their ability to
petition the government for redress of grievances.
In addition to arguing that plaintiffs lacked standing, the defendants responded
on the merits that Donald Trump’s decision to block the plaintiffs from his personal
Twitter account was not state action and is therefore outside the ambit of the First
11
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Amendment. They likewise argued that the @realDonaldTrump account is not a
government-controlled venue for private speech subject to the strictures of the
public-forum doctrine, but rather, a private platform used by Donald Trump to
disseminate his own speech.
2. The District Court’s Decision
In May 2018, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs against defendants Trump and Scavino. At the outset, the district court
dismissed the claims against two defendants (Sarah Huckabee Sanders and Hope
Hicks) because they did not have authority to operate the @realDonaldTrump
account, SPA.15 n.6, SPA.24, but the court determined that plaintiffs had standing to
pursue claims against Donald Trump and Daniel Scavino. SPA.25-SPA.33.
Turning to the merits, the court held that the blocking of the individual
plaintiffs from the @realDonaldTrump account violates the First Amendment. The
court arrived at that holding by analyzing the account under the public-forum
doctrine and determining that the blocking of the plaintiffs was an impermissible
restriction on access to a public forum.
The district court did not directly address the defendants’ argument that the
blocking of the individual plaintiffs was not state action because it was done by
Donald Trump in his personal capacity, exercising purely private rather than
governmental authority over his personal Twitter account. Instead, the court
reasoned that a separate inquiry into state action is unnecessary when a case involves
12
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access to a forum owned or controlled by the government. The court held that
Donald Trump and Daniel Scavino exercise control over the @realDonaldTrump
account and that their control is governmental, principally because Donald Trump
now uses the account, inter alia, to make statements about official matters and perform
official functions. SPA.45-SPA.48.
The district court then undertook to define the contours of the putative “public
forum” for First Amendment purposes. SPA.51-SPA.58. The court excluded the
content of Donald Trump’s tweets about official matters, which it rightly regarded as
government speech not subject to the First Amendment. SPA.54. The court also
held that the comment threads on @realDonaldTrump, “consisting of the initial tweet
[by Donald Trump], direct replies to that tweet, and second-order (and higher-order)
replies to those replies,” are not a forum. SPA.50. However, the court concluded
that the “interactive space for replies and retweets created by each tweet sent by the
@realDonaldTrump account” qualifies as a public forum for First Amendment
purposes. SPA.54-SPA.55.
The court classified this “interactive space” as a “designated public forum”
because it is accessible to the public at large, and anyone with a Twitter account that
has not been blocked may participate in that space by replying to or retweeting the
President’s tweets. SPA.60-SPA.61. Having classified the “space” as a designated
public forum, the court held that the blocking of the individual plaintiffs based on
their viewpoint was a constitutionally impermissible restriction on access to the
13
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forum. SPA.63-SPA.64. The court reasoned that if Donald Trump wished to
exercise his right not to listen to these plaintiffs, he could do so by muting them,
which would not prevent the muted users from accessing the interactive space
beneath his own tweets. SPA.66-SPA.68.
The court accordingly granted plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment
in part. The court declined to issue an injunction, concluding that a declaratory
judgment was likely to afford plaintiffs the relief they sought. SPA.69-SPA.74.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Since 2009, Donald Trump has used his personal Twitter account,
@realDonaldTrump, to share his opinions on popular culture, world affairs, and
politics. Though the account undoubtedly has garnered more followers and public
interest since Donald Trump became President, its essential nature has not changed.
It remains a private mechanism that Donald Trump possesses to communicate
statements he wishes to make to his followers on Twitter and to any other person
who visits the @realDonaldTrump page.
The district court concluded that Donald Trump’s decision to block the
individual plaintiffs from his personal Twitter account violated the First Amendment
because they can no longer reply directly to tweets posted by Donald Trump on that
account. The district court further concluded that the @realDonaldTrump account, a
personal account on a privately-controlled social media platform used by Donald
Trump to facilitate his own expression, is a government-controlled forum for public
14
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speech. In so holding, the district court engaged in an unprecedented expansion of
the public-forum doctrine, transforming it from a bulwark against governmental
regulation of speech into a tool for judicial superintendence of personal Twitter
accounts and private interactions among Twitter users.
This Court should reject that result. The public-forum doctrine does not come
into play unless a plaintiff has been excluded from a space that is owned or controlled
by the government. E.g., West Farms Assocs. v. State Traffic Comm’n, 951 F.2d 469, 473
(2d Cir. 1991). And because the Constitution protects only against government
abridgement of speech, exclusion from such space must be attributable to the use of
governmental, rather than private, authority. E.g., Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005). Here, the @realDonaldTrump account is neither
owned nor controlled by the federal government; it belongs to Donald Trump in his
personal capacity. And his use of the block function—a feature that was created by
Twitter, a private corporation, and made available to all Twitter users—is merely an
exercise of his personal, not governmental, authority to exclude individuals from that
private account.
The district court concluded that Donald Trump’s personal Twitter account
has been transformed into government-controlled property because he has used that
account to post messages relating to the affairs of his administration. That improperly
conflates the President’s private property with his use of that property to further
public functions. For example, Presidents have long sought respite from the White
15
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House at private residences they own: before Donald J. Trump and Mar-a-Lago,
there was George W. Bush and his Crawford ranch, John F. Kennedy and his family
compound in Hyannis Port, and Franklin D. Roosevelt and his Hyde Park estate, to
name but a few. No one could seriously contend that if any of those Presidents
opened up their private residences for the public at large to attend an official speech
and then engage in a town-hall-style debate, the First Amendment would somehow
constrain them from nevertheless excluding from their own homes certain individuals
who had previously criticized them and with whom they did not wish to
communicate, or that it would constrain their choice of audience members to take
questions from, thereby providing a platform for some voices, while necessarily
excluding others. Their choice to host such a speech does not somehow transform
their property into the property of the government, and they would remain free to
exercise private control over use of and access to such property.
This common-sense rule for real property owned by public officials applies no
less to intangible property like a personal Twitter account. Donald Trump’s use of
@realDonaldTrump to make statements about official matters does not transform his
personal Twitter account into one controlled by the government. Likewise, such use
does not alter the fundamentally private, rather than governmental, nature of the
authority exercised by Donald Trump over access to that account.
Nor is the @realDonaldTrump account a public forum, in whole or in part.
Since its creation, Donald Trump has used the account as a platform for his own
16
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speech, not as a place for the private expression of others. Twitter’s terms and
conditions allow its users to interact with each other by, inter alia, replying to or
retweeting another user’s tweets, and to that extent, Twitter as a social media platform
may be a private forum for public expressive conduct (though not a public forum in
the First Amendment sense). But the @realDonaldTrump account is simply the
means through which Donald Trump participates in that forum; it is not a public
forum itself.
By blocking the plaintiffs, Donald Trump has limited their ability to reply
directly to his tweets on @realDonaldTrump. But that limitation does not implicate
the First Amendment. See Minnesota State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271,
288 (1984) (“A person’s right to speak is not infringed when the government simply
ignores that person while listening to others.”). Nothing in the First Amendment
divests Donald Trump of the ability to decline to receive messages on his private
property that he does not wish to hear, nor does it compel him to allow others to use
his speech as a platform to amplify their own. The public-forum doctrine is
fundamentally unsuited for overseeing Donald Trump’s private choices regarding the
use of his personal Twitter account.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal arises from the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment
against the defendants on the basis of stipulated facts. This Court reviews a grant of
summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards that govern the district
17
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court’s consideration of the motion. Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 123 (2d
Cir. 2013). All questions presented in this appeal are questions of law. This Court
reviews questions of law, including questions of constitutional interpretation, de novo.
United States v. Henry, 888 F.3d 589 (2d Cir. 2018).
ARGUMENT
THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT CONSTRAIN DONALD TRUMP
IN BLOCKING OTHER USERS FROM HIS OWN TWITTER ACCOUNT
The district court’s decision here is an exercise in trying to fit a square peg into
a round hole. Contrary to the court’s belief, this case is not about a government
restriction on access to a public forum. Donald Trump’s personal Twitter account is
not a public forum, in whole or in part. The @realDonaldTrump account belongs to
and is controlled by Donald Trump, not the federal government, and when he
chooses to block particular individuals from his personal account, he is exercising
purely private, rather than governmental, authority—authority that he enjoys in
common with all Twitter users and that is completely independent of his public office.
The fundamentally personal character of the account, and the private nature of
Donald Trump’s authority over it, place his decisions to block users from the account
beyond the reach of the public-forum doctrine, and indeed, outside the scope of the
First Amendment altogether. Moreover, to the extent that blocking prevents
individuals from replying directly to his tweets, he is merely declining to listen to
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responses that he does not wish to hear, a choice that is constitutionally
unobjectionable and that remains so regardless of the content of his tweets.
A.

Donald Trump’s Blocking of Certain Twitter Users from
@realDonaldTrump Is Private Action Concerning a
Personal Account and Thus Outside the First Amendment’s
Ambit

The First Amendment protects individuals against abridgments of their speech
by the government, not against restrictions attributable to private actions. See, e.g.,
Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2628 n.4 (2014) (“[T]he First Amendment does not
restrict private conduct.”). Accordingly, a plaintiff who claims that he has been
impermissibly excluded from a public forum must show that the putative forum is
owned or controlled by the government. West Farms Assocs. v. State Traffic Comm’n, 951
F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir. 1991). And the plaintiff’s exclusion from the forum must be
attributable to the exercise of state, rather than private, authority. See, e.g., Flagg v.
Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A] litigant claiming that
his constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that the challenged
conduct constitutes ‘state action.’”). Plaintiffs in this case cannot make these
threshold showings.
1. Donald Trump’s personal Twitter account did not become governmentowned or government-controlled property when he became President. The
@realDonaldTrump account belongs to Donald Trump in his personal capacity, not
his official one. He established and began frequent use of the account in 2009, long
19
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before his election and inauguration. And unlike the official @WhiteHouse and
@POTUS accounts, over which he may assert control only by virtue of his
Presidential office, he will retain personal control of the @realDonaldTrump account
after he leaves office. In short, the account belongs to him, not to the federal
government.
His right to use the account, and the terms on which he may use it, are
independent of his public office and do not involve any right or privilege conferred
on him by the Presidency. His use of @realDonaldTrump is governed exclusively by
rules established by Twitter. Twitter is a private company that allows its users the
ability to participate in its privately-operated social media platform in accordance with
the features and limitations imposed by its privately-created software and terms of
service. Twitter—not the government—controls every aspect of that platform,
including whether and how people may tweet and how they may interact with each
other. It is through Twitter’s authority that users may tweet, reply to tweets, and
retweet each other’s tweets, and it is Twitter’s authority—not its users’, and certainly
not the government’s—that determines whether and how its users may decline to
interact with each other.
The district court acknowledged that Twitter is a private company and that it
“maintains control over the @realDonaldTrump account (and all other Twitter
accounts).” SPA.43. However, the court noted that Donald Trump and Daniel
Scavino exercise control over “various aspects” of the @realDonaldTrump account.
20
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Id. The court went on to hold that this control was “governmental,” thereby
transforming @realDonaldTrump into a government-controlled account. Id.
That holding is fundamentally misconceived. In characterizing the control
exercised by Donald Trump (and by Daniel Scavino on his behalf) as “governmental,”
the court relied on the facts that the @realDonaldTrump account is registered to
“Donald J. Trump, ‘45th President of the United States of America, Washington,
D.C.,’” (Stipulation ¶ 35 (A54-A55)), that the President’s tweets are official records
under the Presidential Records Act, (id. ¶ 40 (A57)), and that tweets on
@realDonaldTrump have been used in the course of carrying out executive functions,
such as interacting with foreign leaders or announcing official government business,
(id. ¶ 38 (A56)). SPA.43-SPA.44. None of these facts transforms the
@realDonaldTrump account into government-controlled property.
The fact that the web page for the @realDonaldTrump account lists Donald
Trump’s current public position obviously does not transform that privately-owned
account into a government-controlled one. The account is registered to “Donald J.
Trump”—in contrast to the @POTUS account, which is registered to “President
Trump.” Stipulation ¶ 35 (A54-A55). The further notation on the web page that
Donald Trump is “45th President of the United States of America” is a factual
statement, not an assertion of ownership by the government. It merely records the
fact that Donald Trump happens to be (and will always be, even after he leaves office)
the 45th President. Indeed, Barack Obama’s current, private Twitter page
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(https://twitter.com/BarackObama) describes him as “Dad, husband, President,
citizen”; George W. Bush’s current, private Twitter page
(https://twitter.com/georgewbush_43) describes him as “43rd President of the
United States”; and Bill Clinton’s current, private Twitter page
(https://twitter.com/billclinton) describes him as “42nd President of the United
States.”
Nor does the fact that Donald Trump uses tweets on @realDonaldTrump to
make statements concerning the actions and policies of his administration transform
the account as a whole into government-controlled property, much less transform his
decisions about whom to block into exercises of governmental authority. He tweeted
about public affairs even before becoming President, and since assuming the
Presidency, he has continued to use @realDonaldTrump to discuss matters unrelated
to government business, including purely personal topics. Stipulation ¶ 32 (A54); see,
e.g., A77 (“Congratulations to Eric & Lara on the birth of their son, Eric ‘Luke’
Trump this morning! https://t.co/Aw0AV82XdE”), A82 (“A great book by a great
guy, highly recommended! https://t.co/3jbDDN8YmJ”), A98 (“Will be at the
Women’s U.S. Open Today!”), A122 (“Happy Easter to everyone!”). The fact that he
also uses the account to discuss official matters does not turn it into a government
account. Presidents retain personal ownership and control over property that they
acquired prior to their inauguration. A President’s private residence does not become
government property when the President issues public statements or conducts official
22
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business there. So too, Donald Trump’s decision to tweet about official matters
cannot transform his private Twitter account, which he uses as a platform to
disseminate his views on a wide range of topics, into a government-controlled forum.
Cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972) (“[P]roperty [does not] lose its
private character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated
purposes.”).
The district court’s suggestion that @realDonaldTrump is controlled by the
federal government is particularly misconceived with respect to the specific aspect of
that account that is at the heart of this case—the capacity of other Twitter users to
reply to Donald Trump’s tweets, a capability that the court characterized as an
“interactive space.” The only control over that “space” available to Donald Trump is
Twitter’s blocking function, a function that is available to all Twitter users. As starkly
confirmed by the fact that he will have control over whether the individual plaintiffs
are blocked from that same exact “space” even after he himself is no longer
President—including for the tweets about official matters on his timeline from the
period of his Presidency—Donald Trump’s use of the Twitter blocking function does
not make that space government controlled. 2

The blocking of the individual plaintiffs was performed by Donald Trump
himself, not by Daniel Scavino. See Stipulation ¶ 53 (A62) (“[T]he President blocked
each of the individual plaintiffs”); SPA.25 (“[T]he record is devoid of any suggestion
that [Scavino] blocked the individual plaintiffs.”).
23
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2. Having concluded that the @realDonaldTrump account was governmentcontrolled property, the district court declined to engage in a separate analysis of
whether Donald Trump’s blocking of the individual plaintiffs from the
@realDonaldTrump account involved state action. The court regarded government
control of the account as sufficient to turn the act of excluding users from the
account into state action. SPA.45-46 (“As the Second Circuit has recently explained,
‘[b]ecause facilities or locations deemed to be public forums are usually operated by
governments, determining that a particular facility or location is a public forum usually
suffices to render the challenged action taken there to be state action subject to First
Amendment limitations.” (quoting Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 882 F.3d
300, 306-07 (2d Cir. 2018))). The district court recognized that “further analysis may
be necessary when the party exercising control over the forum is a nongovernmental
entity,” SPA.46, but failed to recognize another key circumstance in which the First
Amendment would not be implicated: when a forum is government controlled, but
the person trying to exclude someone from that forum cannot fairly be said to be a
state actor.
For the reasons already given, the district court was wrong to think that the
@realDonaldTrump account is controlled by the federal government. But even if the
account were deemed to be government controlled, it would not necessarily (and in
fact does not) follow that Donald Trump’s blocking of other Twitter users involves
state action. State action requires a showing both (1) that “the party charged with the
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deprivation . . . may fairly be said to be a state actor,” and (2) that the deprivation was
“caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of
conduct imposed by the State.” Flagg, 396 F.3d at 186; see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988) (explaining that state action requires that the public official’s conduct
was “made possible only because [the official] is clothed with the authority of [federal]
law”) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941))); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (“[T]he deprivation must be caused by the exercise of
some right or privilege created by the State.”).
Particularly where “government-controlled” property is also subject to control
by private parties, or by parties exercising private rather than governmental authority,
exclusion from the property can fail this test. For example, Twitter, by virtue of its
control over its social media platform, may choose to ban particular accounts that
have violated its terms of service, including any terms of service that may draw
viewpoint- or content-based distinctions. In doing so, Twitter disables the banned
account holder from replying to other users’ tweets, including @realDonaldTrump
tweets. But even assuming, as the district court erroneously did, that the “interactive
space” associated with those tweets is government-controlled property, Twitter is not
exercising any governmental authority when it bans a user, and the resulting exclusion
of the user from that “space” does not involve any state action.
The same is true where, as here, a public official exercises control over his own
property using means that were available to him prior to assuming office and are not
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dependent on that office. Such actions do not involve “the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the state or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state.” Flagg, 396
F.3d at 186. Instead, they are among the wide range of conduct that courts have
considered to be within “the ambit of [the official’s] personal pursuits” and “plainly
excluded” from being considered state action. Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 548 (2d
Cir. 1994) (quoting Screws v. United States¸325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945) (plurality)); see also,
e.g., Zherka v. DiFiore, 412 F. App’x 345, 347 (2d Cir. 2011) (district attorney’s
telephone call to newspaper complaining about an article not state action); Colombo v.
O’Connell, 310 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (school superintendent’s
letter, written by a private lawyer, threatening to file libel suit not state action); Monsky
v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[S]ome actions by a judge are taken
without any relationship to the judge’s office or authority, and are therefore not taken
under color of law.”); Federer v. Gephardt, 363 F.3d 754, 759 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Federer
asserts that he has alleged state action because he alleged that Mr. Gephardt was a
member of the United States House of Representatives . . . . However, a defendant’s
employment does not make the defendant a governmental actor for all purposes. The
particular action complained of must be fairly attributable to the respective
government.”).
Here, Donald Trump’s blocking of the individual plaintiffs from his
@realDonaldTrump account does not remotely qualify as state action. As already
discussed, Twitter is a private social media platform created and operated by a private
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company. Twitter, not the government, created the block function and determined
what the consequences of using that function would be. And Twitter has provided all
of its users with the ability to exercise the block function. Donald Trump’s use of the
block function on the @realDonaldTrump account is thus not dependent on any
privilege granted to or enjoyed by him by virtue of his current office; it is a choice that
is available to any “ordinary citizen[]” and therefore not attributable to the
government. Monsky, 127 F.3d at 246. Again, this is confirmed by the fact that
Donald Trump enjoyed the ability to block users from the @realDonaldTrump
account before he assumed office, and that he will continue to have that ability after
he leaves. 3
The district court acknowledged that blocking “is a capability held by every
Twitter user,” but reasoned that “the power to exclude is also one afforded generally
to every property owner,” yet government property remains subject to the reach of
the public-forum doctrine. SPA.47-SPA.48. When property belongs to the government, however, an authorized official’s decision to exclude involves an exercise of the
government’s own authority. Here, what is critical is not simply that Twitter has
conferred the right to block on all Twitter account holders, private as well as public; it

That result is not altered by the fact that the decision to block particular
plaintiffs may have been prompted by their responses to tweets about official matters.
See, e.g., Colombo, 310 F.3d at 118 (private threat by local official to sue over criticism
of official’s public acts was not state action because official’s ability to sue was not
possessed by virtue of state law).
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is that when Donald Trump blocks users from his personal Twitter account, the right
to block belongs to him as a private account holder, independent of his public office.
As a result, the fact that Donald Trump is President does not suffice to
transform his control over other users’ interactions with @realDonaldTrump into
governmental action. Again, public officials retain their rights of private ownership
over their property after their assumption of office, and they similarly retain the ability
to restrict access to that property in their private capacity. It is beyond serious
dispute, for example, that George W. Bush could have, without violating the First
Amendment, held a massive town-hall-style debate on his Crawford ranch that was
generally open to the public but closed to particularly vehement critics of his
Presidency, and similarly, could have freely chosen which audience members to take
questions from. That type of private decision regarding the use of his own personal
property would not have been subject to constitutional scrutiny if performed during
the 2000 election campaign, and it would not have radically transformed into a
governmental decision subject to First Amendment constraints if it were performed
during the 2004 re-election campaign.
So too here. When Donald Trump chose to block the individual plaintiffs from
his personal account, he was employing a capability in common with all other users of
private Twitter accounts—a capability that did not depend on his status as President,
that he would enjoy even if he did not hold any governmental office, and that he will
continue to enjoy once he no longer holds any governmental office. The First
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Amendment simply does not apply to his private choices about excluding others from
his personal Twitter account.
B.

@realDonaldTrump Is a Vehicle for Disseminating Donald
Trump’s Own Speech, Not a Forum Designed to Facilitate
the Speech of Others

The district court’s failure to recognize the private nature of Donald Trump’s
personal Twitter account and the private character of his action in blocking other
Twitter users from the account is enough by itself to require reversal. But it is not the
only dispositive error in the court’s decision. The decision also rests on the
fundamentally misconceived premise that @realDonaldTrump is a “forum” intended
to facilitate the private expression of others.
To qualify as a public forum to which First Amendment protections apply, it is
not enough for the property or other space in question to be owned or controlled by
the government. In addition, unless the property is a traditional public forum such as
a public park or street, the government must have intentionally opened up the
property to provide a place for members of the public to communicate with each
other. See Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250
(2015) (“[The] government ‘does not create a public forum by inaction or by
permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum
for public discourse.’” (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 802 (1985)); Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2001) (“A
designated public forum is created by purposeful governmental action—that is, when
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the government ‘intentionally open[s] a nontraditional forum for public discourse.’”)
(alteration in original); see also West Farms Assocs., 951 F.2d at 473. If this element is
lacking, the public forum doctrine and its attendant First Amendment protections do
not apply. See, e.g., United States v. American Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003)
(plurality op.) (declining to apply forum analysis to the installation of internet filtering
software at public libraries because “[a] public library does not acquire Internet
terminals in order to create a public forum for Web publishers to express
themselves”).
Courts must be cautious in determining that a new medium for expressive
conduct satisfies this requirement. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that
“the public forum doctrine should not be extended in a mechanical way” to contexts
that are “very different” from the “streets and parks” where the doctrine first arose.
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672-73 (1998); see also Denver
Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 749 (1996) (“[W]e are wary
of the notion that a partial analogy in one context, for which [courts] have developed
doctrines, can compel a full range of decisions in . . . new and changing area[s].”).
Here, the @realDonaldTrump account does not constitute a public forum, in whole
or in part. The object of the account is not to provide the public with a venue to
communicate with and about Donald Trump, but rather to provide Donald Trump
with a tool to express his own views and convey them to other Twitter users and the
world at large.
30

Case 18-1691, Document 25, 08/07/2018, 2362018, Page37 of 124

1. From the time that Donald Trump first created his personal Twitter account
in 2009, @realDonaldTrump has served as a platform for him to engage in his own
speech and convey his own thoughts to a large and ever-growing audience. That
purpose has not changed since he became President. He continues to use his account
as a vehicle to disseminate his own speech, not as a place for the private expression of
others. See, e.g., Stipulation ¶ 37 (A55-A56) (“Dan Scavino, has, on at least one
occasion, promoted @realDonaldTrump . . . as [a] channel[ ] through which
‘President Donald J. Trump . . . [c]ommunicat[es] directly with you, the American
people!”) (fourth and fifth alterations in original). To the extent that these tweets are,
as the district court concluded, “governmental” in nature, they are government speech
to which the First Amendment in general, and the public-forum doctrine in particular,
do not apply. SPA.52 (“Government speech is one category of speech that falls
outside the domain of forum analysis.”); see Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250 (“First
Amendment strictures that attend the various types of government-established
forums do not apply” to government speech.); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S.
460, 467 (2009) (“The Free Speech Clause . . . does not regulate government
speech.”).
The district court itself recognized that Donald Trump’s own tweets are not
part of a public forum. See SPA.54 (“Based on the government speech doctrine, we
reject out of hand any contention that the content of the President’s tweets are
susceptible to forum analysis.”) But it failed to appreciate the full significance of that
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fact. Donald Trump’s tweets are the whole raison d’etre of his personal Twitter
account. The heart of the @realDonaldTrump account are the tweets posted by
Donald Trump (or, on occasion, by Daniel Scavino on his behalf) expressing Donald
Trump’s own views. The “intended purpose” of the account (Forbes, 523 U.S. at 67273) was not to provide an opportunity for other Twitter users to communicate to or
about Donald Trump, but rather to provide him with an opportunity to communicate
to them.
To be sure, Twitter’s terms and conditions allow its users to interact with each
other in a variety of ways, including by replying to or retweeting another user’s tweet.
Twitter allows multiple overlapping exchanges between individuals; for example, one
user may tweet, a second may reply to the tweet, a third may reply to that reply, a
fourth may retweet the exchange, and a fifth may choose to block the original tweeter,
as an expression of disapproval. To the extent that Twitter provides the means for
conversations among its many users, Twitter as a whole could be characterized as a
private forum for public expression—though not a “public forum” in the First
Amendment sense, given its non-governmental character. But individual Twitter
accounts like @realDonaldTrump are not themselves public forums, in the First
Amendment or any other sense. They are merely the mechanism through which
individuals can express their own views and engage—or decline to engage—with
other Twitter users as they wish. The @realDonaldTrump account permits Donald
Trump to participate on Twitter by posting messages, reading others’ messages, and
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interacting—or choosing not to interact—with others in response to those messages.
But that does not make the account itself a “forum,” public or otherwise.
2. When Donald Trump posts a tweet on @realDonaldTrump, that message is
viewable by other Twitter users (and indeed by anyone with a Web browser).
Twitter’s reply function enables other Twitter users to directly respond to that
message and to notify @realDonaldTrump that they have done so.
The district court treated as a “public forum” under the First Amendment the
capability of Twitter users to reply to Donald Trump’s tweets—which it characterized
as the “interactive space” beneath such a tweet. This reasoning is doubly flawed.
First, the court’s “interactive space” jargon confuses rather than advances the First
Amendment analysis. When one individual replies to another in the physical world,
no one would think the ability to reply is itself a “forum.” If the reply happens to be
offered in a public forum, restrictions by the government on the right to reply are
subject to the First Amendment. But if the location of the reply does not meet the
requirements for a public forum, there can be no bootstrapping into First
Amendment protection merely by applying the “forum” label to the reply itself.
Second, in any event, the fact that Twitter gives users the capability to reply to Donald
Trump’s tweets does not mean that he (let alone the government) “intentionally
open[ed]” @realDonaldTrump as a venue “for public discourse” rather than as a
platform to talk to the public, Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250.
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Twitter enables account users to customize their interactions with each other in
a variety of ways, some of which are analogous to ways that speakers may interact in
physical settings. Blocking is one such feature. Twitter’s website describes
“blocking” as a “feature that helps you control how you interact with other accounts
on Twitter.” How to block accounts on Twitter, Twitter
https://support.twitter.com/articles/117063 (last visited July 24, 2018) (emphasis
added). Blocking provides a user with a way to ignore another speaker whom the
blocking user does not wish to hear. And blocking may itself serve as a form of
expression, conveying disapproval of the blocked user.
When individual users are blocked from the @realDonaldTrump account, they
remain free to participate in the broad exchange of information and ideas on Twitter.
The blocked plaintiffs can, and do, continue to tweet about the current Administration’s policies and to criticize President Trump’s agenda through their own accounts
on Twitter. They can read Donald Trump’s tweets (other than directly through their
blocked accounts), and they can respond to his tweets by posting responsive tweets
on their own Twitter pages. They may mention the @realDonaldTrump account in
their tweets, reproduce screenshots of Donald Trump’s tweets in their own tweets,
and engage with other Twitter users who are discussing the content of
@realDonaldTrump tweets, including those who have replied to or retweeted
@realDonaldTrump tweets. Indeed, several of the individual plaintiffs have
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participated in conversations that originated with other users’ replies to
@realDonaldTrump tweets. Stipulation ¶¶ 57-58 (A64-A66).
Accordingly, the only material impact that blocking has on the individual
plaintiffs’ ability to express themselves on Twitter is that it prevents them from
speaking directly to Donald Trump by replying to his tweets on the
@realDonaldTrump web page. See SPA.58, SPA.60-SPA.61. But that impact does
not implicate the First Amendment. As the Supreme Court has made clear, “[a]
person’s right to speak is not infringed when the government simply ignores that
person while listening to others.” Minnesota State Bd. For Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S.
271, 288 (1984). The First Amendment does not limit public officials’ ability to
choose with whom they wish to speak and to whom they wish to listen. Id. at 283,
288 (“Appellees have no constitutional right to force the government to listen to their
views.”). Thus, an official can turn away from a critic whom he encounters on the
street, or choose not to engage with a hostile individual in a public place. When
Donald Trump chooses to block a particular user from @realDonaldTrump, he is
exercising the same prerogative. Neither the public-forum doctrine nor any other
First Amendment principle obligates him to entertain replies on his own Twitter page
from users from whom he does not wish to hear.
The district court faulted Donald Trump’s recourse to blocking, rather than
muting, as a means of declining to engage with particular Twitter users, because
blocking has a different impact on the potential reach of the blocked user’s tweets.
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SPA.65-SPA.67. The court noted that “[t]he audience for a reply extends more
broadly than the sender of the tweet being replied to,” SPA.67, because other persons
who view the original tweet can, at least in principle, see the reply by clicking on the
original tweet. 4 As a result, a reply on @realDonaldTrump may be seen by more
persons than a freestanding responsive tweet that appears only on the blocked user’s
Twitter page. In contrast to muting, blocking prevents the blocked user from posting
a reply that is visible to other users who are viewing Donald Trump’s tweets.
But there is nothing constitutionally problematic about that result. Given the
size of Donald Trump’s Twitter audience, it may well be that another user’s words will
be seen by more people if he can display them on Donald Trump’s web page. But
just as the First Amendment does not give anyone the right to compel a public official
to listen to their speech, neither it does entitle anyone to piggyback on the government’s speech as a way to amplify their own. See Knight, 465 U.S. at 288 (explaining
that it is “doubtless true” that the government’s choice to listen to some speakers and
not others may “amplif[y]” some voices over others, and nevertheless concluding that
such decisions do not infringe speech).
By way of physical analogy, suppose that a President gives a speech before a
large audience in an auditorium, and then entertains questions and comments from
The visibility of a reply depends in part on the number of replies that the
tweet receives. If a tweet receives a large volume of replies, a given reply may be lost
from view as a practical matter. A typical tweet by Donald Trump generates
thousands of replies. Stipulation ¶ 41 (A57-A58).
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the audience after his remarks. He chooses to pass over one member of the audience
who has previously made hostile remarks. While the passed-over member remains
free to say whatever he wants outside the auditorium, the President’s decision not to
hear from him effectively denies the individual the opportunity to be heard by the
President’s large audience within. Yet no one would seriously suggest that the
audience member’s constitutional rights have been violated or that the First
Amendment obligates the President to call on him. The First Amendment entitles
him to speak; it does not entitle him to borrow the President’s audience for his
remarks. And again, this is especially true if the auditorium is the President’s personal
property, over which he retains a private, not governmental, right to exclude.
So too here. A Twitter user might garner more attention with a reply tweet that
is sent directly to @realDonaldTrump than with an identical tweet on his own
account or a reply tweet sent to another Twitter user with a smaller following. But
blocking the user does not prevent him from speaking; it merely limits his access to
Donald Trump’s own audience on @realDonaldTrump. That is not a denial of access
to a public forum, and it does not offend the First Amendment.
In short, regardless of whether the @realDonaldTrump account is viewed in its
entirety or disaggregated into judicially manufactured “spaces,” it does not bear a
meaningful resemblance to a public forum, and it is wholly unsuited for the application of traditional public-forum principles. It is now, as it has been since its creation,
a vehicle to facilitate Donald Trump’s own speech, not a platform to facilitate or
37
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amplify the speech of others. As such, public forum analysis is not “compatible with
the intended purpose of the property.” Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673 (quoting Perry Educ.
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)). When Donald Trump
makes decisions about how to interact with other Twitter users, he is acting as a
participant in the marketplace of ideas, not a regulator of the marketplace. Cf. Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980) (“The basic distinction . . . between States as
market participants and States as market regulators makes good sense and sound
law.”). And when he chooses to block other Twitter users from his personal account,
he is declining to communicate with them or allow them to communicate with others
through him, but he is not preventing them from participating in expressive conduct
on Twitter. For this reason, as well as the lack of governmental control or action,
there is no basis for the district court’s conclusion that Donald Trump’s decision to
block the individual plaintiffs from the @realDonaldTrump account is an
unconstitutional restriction on access to a public forum.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment in part for plaintiffs should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
CHAD A. READLER
Acting Assistant Attorney General
HASHIM M. MOOPPAN
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
SCOTT R. MCINTOSH
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JENNIFER UTRECHT
Attorneys, Appellate Staff
Civil Division, Room 7710
U.S. Department of Justice
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------X
KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE AT
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, REBECCA BUCKWALTER,
PHILIP COHEN, HOLLY FIGUEROA, EUGENE GU,
BRANDON NEELY, JOSEPH PAPP, and
NICHOLAS PAPPAS,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
17 Civ. 5205 (NRB)

Plaintiffs,
- against DONALD J. TRUMP, HOPE HICKS, SARAH
HUCKABEE SANDERS, and DANIEL SCAVINO,
Defendants.
----------------------------------------X
NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This case requires us to consider whether a public official
may, consistent with the First Amendment, “block” a person from
his Twitter account in response to the political views that person
has expressed, and whether the analysis differs because that public
official is the President of the United States.

The answer to

both questions is no.
Our analysis proceeds as follows.
background

facts

regarding

Twitter

We first set forth the
as

a

platform,

the

@realDonaldTrump account that is the center of this dispute, the
plaintiffs,

and

this

case’s

procedural

history.

Because

defendants object to our adjudication of this case based on
plaintiffs’ lack of standing, we then turn -- as we must -- to the
consideration of those jurisdictional arguments.
1
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the

plaintiffs

have

established

the

prerequisites

to

our

jurisdiction: they have experienced a legally cognizable injury,
those injuries are traceable to the President and Daniel Scavino’s
conduct, and a favorable judicial decision on the merits is likely
to redress those injuries.
We

then

proceed

Amendment claims.

to

the

substance

of

plaintiffs’

First

We hold that portions of the @realDonaldTrump

account -- the “interactive space” where Twitter users may directly
engage with the content of the President’s tweets -- are properly
analyzed under the “public forum” doctrines set forth by the
Supreme Court, that such space is a designated public forum, and
that the blocking of the plaintiffs based on their political speech
constitutes
Amendment.

viewpoint

discrimination

that

violates

the

First

In so holding, we reject the defendants’ contentions

that the First Amendment does not apply in this case and that the
President’s personal First Amendment interests supersede those of
plaintiffs.
Finally, we consider what form of relief should be awarded,
as plaintiffs seek both declaratory relief and injunctive relief.
While we reject defendants’ categorical assertion that injunctive
relief cannot ever be awarded against the President, we nonetheless
conclude that it is unnecessary to enter that legal thicket at
this time.

A declaratory judgment should be sufficient, as no

government official -- including the President -- is above the
2
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law, and all government officials are presumed to follow the law
as has been declared.
I.

Background
The facts presented below are drawn almost entirely from the

stipulation of facts between the parties, see Stipulation, Sept.
28,

2017,

ECF

No.

30-1,

which

“applies

exclusively

to

this

litigation and does not constitute an admission for purposes of
any other proceeding,” Stip. at 1.1
A.

The Twitter Platform

“Twitter is a social media platform with more than 300 million
active users worldwide, including some 70 million in the United
States.”

Stip. ¶ 13.

A “‘user’ is an individual who has created

an account on the platform.”

Stip. ¶ 14.

“A Twitter user must

have an account name, which is an @ symbol followed by a unique
identifier (e.g., @realDonaldTrump), and a descriptive name (e.g.,
Donald J. Trump). The account name is called the user’s ‘handle.’”
Stip. ¶ 16.
Twitter “allows users to post short messages,” Stip. ¶ 13,
which are called “tweets,” Stip. ¶ 14.

Tweets may be “up to [280]

characters in length,”2 may “include photographs, videos, and

1

We appreciate the parties’ professional response to our suggestion that
they stipulate to the underlying facts so that the legal issues presented by
this dispute could be addressed without the need to undertake a lengthy
discovery process.
2 At the time of the parties’ stipulation, most users were limited to 140
characters per tweet. The limit has since been increased to 280 characters.
See Aliza Rosen, Tweeting Made Easier, Twitter (Nov. 7, 2017), https://blog
.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/product/2017/tweetingmadeeasier.html.
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links,” and are posted “to a webpage on Twitter that is attached
to the user’s account.”

Stip. ¶ 14.

“An individual ‘tweet’

comprises the tweeted content (i.e., the message, including any
embedded photograph, video, or link), the user’s account name (with
a link to the user’s Twitter webpage), the user’s profile picture,
the date and time the tweet was generated, and the number of times
the tweet has been replied to . . . , retweeted by . . . , or liked
by . . . other users.”

Stip. ¶ 17.

The Twitter webpage that displays the collection of a user’s
tweets is known as the user’s “timeline.”

Stip. ¶ 15.

“When a

user generates a tweet, the timeline updates immediately to include
that tweet,” and “[a]nyone who can view a user’s Twitter webpage
can see the user’s timeline.”

Stip. ¶ 15.

“A user’s Twitter

webpage may also include a short biographical description; a
profile picture, such as a headshot; a ‘header’ image, which
appears as a banner at the top of the webpage; the user’s location;
a button labeled ‘Message,’ which allows two users to correspond
privately; and a small sample of photographs and videos posted to
the user’s timeline, which link to a full gallery.”

Stip. ¶ 16.

“By default, Twitter webpages and their associated timelines are
visible to everyone with internet access, including those who are
not Twitter users.

However, although non-users can view users’

Twitter webpages (if the accounts are public), they cannot interact
with users on the Twitter platform.”
4
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A defining feature of Twitter is a user’s ability “to repost
or respond to others’ messages, and to interact with other Twitter
users in relation to those messages.” Stip. ¶ 13. “Beyond posting
tweets . . . , Twitter users can engage with one another in a
variety of ways.” Stip. ¶ 21. First, “they can ‘retweet’ -- i.e.,
repost -- the tweets of other users, either by posting them
directly to their own followers or by ‘quoting’ them in their own
tweets.

When a user retweets a tweet, it appears on the user’s

timeline in the same form as it did on the original user’s
timeline,

but

retweeted.”

with

a

notation

indicating

that

the

post

was

Stip. ¶ 21.

Second, “[a] Twitter user can also reply

to other users’ tweets.

Like any other tweet, a reply can be up

to [280] characters in length and can include photographs, videos,
and links.”

Stip. ¶ 22.

This reply may be viewed in two places:

when a user sends a reply, “the reply appears on the user’s
timeline under a tab labeled ‘Tweets & replies.’”

However, the

reply may also be accessed from the feed of the user sending the
tweet being replied to: “by clicking on the tweet that prompted
the reply[,] the reply will appear below the original tweet, along
with other users’ replies to the same tweet.”

Stip. ¶ 22.

Third,

“[a] Twitter user can also ‘favorite’ or ‘like’ another user’s
tweet by clicking on the heart icon that appears under the tweet.
By ‘liking’ a tweet, a user may mean to convey approval or to
acknowledge having seen the tweet.”
5
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Twitter user can also ‘mention’ another user by including the other
user’s Twitter handle in a tweet.

A Twitter user mentioned by

another user will receive a ‘notification’ that he or she has been
mentioned in another user’s tweet.” Stip. ¶ 25. Finally, “Twitter
users can subscribe to other users’ messages by ‘following’ those
users’ accounts. Users generally can see all tweets posted or
retweeted by accounts they have followed.”

Stip. ¶ 19. “Tweets,

retweets, replies, likes, and mentions are controlled by the user
who generates them.

No other Twitter user can alter the content

of any retweet or reply, either before or after it is posted.
Twitter users cannot prescreen tweets, replies, likes, or mentions
that reference their tweets or accounts.”

Stip. ¶ 26.

Because a retweet or a reply to a tweet is itself a tweet,
each retweet and reply, recursively, may be retweeted, replied to,
or liked.

“A Twitter user can also reply to other replies.

A

user whose tweet generates replies will see the replies below his
or her original tweet, with any replies-to-replies nested below
the replies to which they respond.
replies-to-replies
thread.’”

is

Stip. ¶ 23.

sometimes

The collection of replies and
referred

to

as

a

‘comment

“Twitter is called a ‘social’ media

platform in large part because of comment threads, which reflect
multiple overlapping ‘conversations’ among and across groups of
users.”

Stip. ¶ 23.

6
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In addition to these means of interaction, Twitter offers two
means of limiting interaction with other users: blocking and
muting.

First, “[a] user who wants to prevent another user from

interacting with her account on the Twitter platform can do so by
‘blocking’ that user.

(Twitter provides users with the capability

to block other users, but it is the users themselves who decide
whether to make use of this capability.)

When a user is signed in

to a Twitter account that has been blocked, the blocked user cannot
see or reply to the blocking user’s tweets, view the blocking
user’s list of followers or followed accounts, or use the Twitter
platform to search for the blocking user’s tweets.

The blocking

user will not be notified if the blocked user mentions her or posts
a tweet; nor, when signed in to her account, will the blocking
user see any tweets posted by the blocked user.”

Stip. ¶ 28.

“If,

while signed in to the blocked account, the blocked user attempts
to follow the blocking user, or to access the Twitter webpage from
which the user is blocked, the blocked user will see a message
indicating

that

the

other

user

has

blocked

him

or

her

from

following the account and viewing the tweets associated with the
account.”
While

Stip. ¶ 29.
blocking

precludes

the

blocked

user

from

directly

interacting with the blocking user’s tweets -- including from
replying or retweeting those tweets, blocking does not eliminate
all interaction between the blocked user and the blocking user.
7
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“After a user has been blocked, the blocked user can still mention
the blocking user.

Tweets mentioning the blocking user will be

visible to anyone who can view the blocked user’s tweets and
replies.

A blocked user can also reply to users who have replied

to the blocking user’s tweets, although the blocked user cannot
see the tweet by the blocking user that prompted the original
reply. These replies-to-replies will appear in the comment thread,
beneath the reply to the blocking user’s original tweet.”
¶ 30.

Stip.

Further, “[i]f a blocked user is not signed in to Twitter,

he or she can view all of the content on Twitter that is accessible
to anyone without a Twitter account.”

Stip. ¶ 31.

As distinguished from blocking, “[m]ut[ing] is a feature that
allows [a user] to remove an account's Tweets from [his or her]
timeline without unfollowing or blocking that account.

Muted

accounts will not know that [the muting user has] muted them and
[the muting user] can unmute them at any time.”

How to Mute

Accounts on Twitter, Twitter (last visited May 22, 2018), https://
help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/twitter-mute
to Mute].3

[hereinafter

How

“Muted accounts can follow [the muting user] and [the

muting user] can follow muted accounts.

Muting an account will

not cause [the muting user] to unfollow them.”

Id.

If a muting

user follows a muted user, “[r]eplies and mentions by the muted

3 The parties agree that we “may take judicial notice of the information
published in the ‘Using Twitter’ and ‘Policies and reporting’ guides available
on Twitter’s ‘Twitter Support’ webpage.” Stip. at 3 n.2.
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account will still appear in [the muting user’s] Notifications
tab,” and “[w]hen [the muting user] click[s] or tap[s] into a
conversation, replies from muted accounts will be visible.”

Id.

By contrast, if a muting user does not follow a muted user,
“[r]eplies and mentions will not appear in [the muting user’s]
Notifications tab,” and “[w]hen [the muting user] click[s] or
tap[s] into a conversation, replies from muted accounts will be
not visible.”
B.

Id.

The @realDonaldTrump Account

“Donald Trump established @realDonaldTrump in March 2009.
Before his inauguration, he used this account to tweet about a
variety of topics, including popular culture and politics.

Since

his inauguration in January 2017, President Trump has used the
@realDonaldTrump

account

as

a

channel

for

communicating

interacting with the public about his administration.

and

He also has

continued to use the account, on occasion, to communicate about
other

issues

business.”

not

directly

Stip. ¶ 32.

related

to

official

government

“The Twitter page associated with the

account is registered to Donald J. Trump, ‘45th President of the
United States of America, Washington, D.C.’”

Stip. ¶ 35.

“The

@realDonaldTrump account is generally accessible to the public at
large without regard to political affiliation or any other limiting
criteria.”

Stip. ¶ 36.

“[A]ny member of the public can view his

tweets without being signed in to Twitter, and anyone who wants to
9
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follow the account can do so.

President Trump has not issued any

rule or statement purporting to limit (by form or subject matter)
the speech of those who reply to his tweets.”
Since

the

President’s

inauguration,

Stip. ¶ 36.

the

@realDonaldTrump

account has been operated with the assistance of defendant Daniel
Scavino, “the White House Social Media Director and Assistant to
the President [who] is sued in his official capacity only.”
¶ 12.

Stip.

“With the assistance of Mr. Scavino in certain instances,

President Trump uses @realDonaldTrump, often multiple times a day,
to announce, describe, and defend his policies; to promote his
Administration’s

legislative

agenda;

to

announce

official

decisions; to engage with foreign political leaders; to publicize
state visits; to challenge media organizations whose coverage of
his

Administration

he

believes

to

be

unfair;

and

for

other

statements, including on occasion statements unrelated to official
government business.

President Trump sometimes uses the account

to announce matters related to official government business before
those matters are announced to the public through other official
channels.”

Stip.

¶ 38.

“For

example,

the

President

used

@realDonaldTrump to announce on June 7, 2017, for the first time,
that he intended to nominate Christopher Wray for the position of
FBI director.”

Stip. ¶ 38.

Since the parties’ stipulation, the

President has also used the @realDonaldTrump account in removing

10
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then-Secretary

of

State

Tillerson4

Rex

Veterans Affairs David Shulkin.5

and

then-Secretary

of

Additionally, “[t]he National

Archives and Records Administration has advised the White House
that

the

President’s

tweets

from

@realDonaldTrump

. . .

are

official records that must be preserved under the Presidential
Records Act.”

Stip. ¶ 40.

“Mr. Scavino in certain instances assists President Trump in
operating the @realDonaldTrump account, including by drafting and
posting tweets to the account.

Other White House aides besides

Mr. Scavino will, in certain instances, also suggest content for
@realDonaldTrump tweets.

President Trump also sometimes dictates

tweets to Mr. Scavino, who then posts them on Twitter.

President

Trump and/or Mr. Scavino sometimes retweet the tweets of those who
participate

in

comment

@realDonaldTrump account.”

threads
Stip. ¶ 39.

associated

with

the

“Mr. Scavino has access

to the @realDonaldTrump account, including the access necessary to
block and unblock individuals from the @realDonaldTrump account,”
Stip. ¶ 12, and has explained that @realDonaldTrump is a channel
“through which ‘President Donald J. Trump . . . [c]ommunicat[es]

4

Michael C. Bender & Felicia Schwartz, Rex Tillerson Is out as Secretary
of State; Donald Trump Taps Mike Pompeo, Wall St. J. (Mar. 13, 2018, 7:20 P.M.),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/rex-tillerson-is-out-as-secretary-of-state
-donald-trump-taps-mike-pompeo-1520978116.
5 Donovan Slack, Veterans Affairs Secretary David Shulkin Is Out, Trump
Announces by Tweet, USA Today (Mar. 28, 2018, 8:46 P.M.), https://www.usatoday
.com/story/news/politics/2018/03/28/david-shulkin-veterans-affairs-secretary
-forced-out-john-kelly/346741002/.
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directly with you, the American people!’”

Stip. ¶ 37 (alterations

and omissions in original).
Twitter users engage frequently with the President’s tweets.
“Typically, tweets from @realDonaldTrump generate thousands of
replies from members of the public, and some of those replies
generate hundreds or thousands of replies in turn.”

Stip. ¶ 41.

“For example, on July 26, 2017, President Trump issued a series of
tweets . . . announcing ‘that the United States Government will
not accept or allow . . . Transgender individuals to serve’ in the
military, and after less than three hours, the three tweets,
collectively, had been retweeted nearly 70,000 times, liked nearly
180,000 times, and replied to about 66,000 times.”

Stip. ¶ 41

(second omission in original).

“This level of engagement is

typical

tweets,”

for

President

Trump’s

Stip.

¶ 42,

which

“frequently receive 15,000–20,000 retweets or more,” Stip. ¶ 42,
and “are each replied to tens of thousands of times,” Stip. ¶ 43.
C.

The Individual Plaintiffs

Rebecca Buckwalter, Philip Cohen, Holly Figueroa, Eugene Gu,
Brandon Neely, Joseph Papp, and Nicholas Pappas (collectively, the
“individual plaintiffs”), are all Twitter users.

Stip. ¶¶ 2-8.

They each tweeted a message critical of the President or his
policies in reply to a tweet from the @realDonaldTrump account.
Stip. ¶¶ 46-52.

Each individual plaintiff had his or her account

blocked shortly thereafter, and each account remains blocked.
12
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Stip. ¶¶ 46-52.

Defendants do “not contest Plaintiffs’ allegation

that the Individual Plaintiffs were blocked from the President’s
Twitter account because the Individual Plaintiffs posted tweets
that criticized the President or his policies.”

Stip. at 1.

“As a result of the President’s blocking of the Individual
Plaintiffs from @realDonaldTrump, the Individual Plaintiffs cannot
view the President’s tweets; directly reply to these tweets; or use
the @realDonaldTrump webpage to view the comment threads associated
with the President’s tweets while they are logged in to their verified
accounts.”

Stip. ¶ 54.

However, “[t]he Individual Plaintiffs can

view tweets from @realDonaldTrump when using an internet browser or
other application that is not logged in to Twitter, or that is logged
in to a Twitter account that is not blocked by @realDonaldTrump.”
Stip. ¶ 55.

Additionally, “[s]ome of the Individual Plaintiffs have

established second accounts so that they can view the President’s
tweets.”

Stip. ¶ 56.

Blocking

does

not

completely

eliminate

the

individual

plaintiffs’ ability to interact with the President’s tweets.

“The

Individual Plaintiffs can view replies to @realDonaldTrump tweets,
and can post replies to those replies, while logged in to the
blocked

accounts.

threads

that

Replies-to-replies

originate

with

appear

@realDonaldTrump

in

the

tweets

comment
and

are

visible to users who have not blocked (or been blocked by) the
Individual Plaintiffs.”

Stip. ¶ 57.

“Although the Individual

Plaintiffs who have been blocked have the ability to view and reply
13
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to replies to @realDonaldTrump tweets, they cannot see the original
@realDonaldTrump tweets themselves when signed in to their blocked
accounts, and in many instances it is difficult to understand the
reply tweets without the context of the original @realDonaldTrump
tweets.”

Stip. ¶ 58.

While “[i]n the past, Plaintiffs Holly

Figueroa, Eugene Gu, and Brandon Neely used a third-party service
called Favstar that could be used by blocked users to view and
reply

to

a

blocking

account’s

tweets

if

the

blocked

user

established a Favstar account and followed certain steps[,] [t]he
parties’ understanding is that it is no longer possible for blocked
users to use the Favstar service to view and reply to a blocking
account’s tweets.”

Stip. ¶ 59.

These workarounds “require [the individual plaintiffs] to take
more steps than non-blocked, signed-in users to view the President’s
tweets.”

Stip. ¶ 55.

“All of the Individual Plaintiffs have found

these various ‘workarounds’ to be burdensome and to delay their
ability to respond to @realDonaldTrump tweets.

As a result, four

of the Individual Plaintiffs do not use them and the others use
them infrequently.”
D.

Stip. ¶ 60.

The Knight Institute

The “Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University
is a 501(c)(3) organization that works to defend and strengthen
the freedoms of speech and the press in the digital age through
strategic litigation, research, and public education.
14
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the Knight First Amendment Institute operate a Twitter account
under

the

handle

@realDonaldTrump.”

@knightcolumbia,
Stip. ¶ 1.

and

this

account

follows

In contrast to the individual

plaintiffs, “[t]he Knight Institute has not been blocked from the
@realDonaldTrump account.”

Stip. ¶ 61.

However, “[t]he Knight

Institute desires to read comments that otherwise would have been
posted by the blocked Plaintiffs, and by other accounts blocked by
@realDonaldTrump, in direct reply to @realDonaldTrump tweets,”
Stip. ¶ 61, and “[t]he @knightcolumbia account follows Professor
Cohen’s account, @familyunequal,” Stip. ¶ 62.

“As of August 22,

2017,” however, “the Knight Institute did not follow the other six
Individual Plaintiffs on Twitter.”
E.

Stip. ¶ 62.

Procedural History

The Knight Institute and the individual plaintiffs filed suit
in July 2017, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and naming
the President, Scavino, and then-White House Press Secretary Sean
Spicer as defendants.

Compl., July 11, 2017, ECF No. 1.

After

Spicer’s resignation in late July 2017, his successor as White
House Press Secretary, Sarah Huckabee Sanders, and White House
Communications Director Hope Hicks were substituted in his place
pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6

6

Hicks has since resigned her position as White House Communications
Director. See Katie Rogers & Maggie Haberman, Hope Hicks is Gone, and It’s Not
Clear Who Can Replace Her, N.Y. Times (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/03/29/us/politics/hope-hicks-white-house.html. Because plaintiffs seek
only prospective relief and Hicks was sued only in her official capacity, Stip.
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See Letter from Jameel Jaffer and Michael H. Baer to the Court,
Sept. 25, 2017, ECF No. 28.

After entering into the stipulation

of facts, defendants moved for summary judgment on October 13,
2017 and plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment on November
3, 2017.
II.

We heard oral argument on March 8, 2018.

Standing
Before turning to the merits of this dispute, “we are required

to assure ourselves of jurisdiction.”

Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Port

Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 760 F.3d 227, 237 n.11 (2d Cir. 2014).

At

bottom,

is

the

“judicial

Power

of

the

United

States”

constitutionally limited to “Cases” and “Controversies.”
Const. art. III, § 2.

U.S.

Because “[s]tanding to sue is a doctrine

rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy,”
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016), “[w]hether
a claimant has standing is the threshold question in every federal
case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit,”
Fair Hous. in Huntington Comm. Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 316
F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 2003).

“If plaintiffs lack Article III

standing, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear their
claim.”

Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v.

Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 181, 198 (2d Cir. 2005).

¶ 10, the fact of Hicks’s resignation alone warrants summary judgment in her
favor. Further, because the President has not yet appointed Hicks’s successor,
no substitution by operation of Rule 25(d) can occur. Hicks will therefore be
dismissed as a defendant, and no one will be substituted in her stead at this
time. The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the caption of this case
accordingly.

16
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The Supreme Court has “established that the ‘irreducible
constitutional minimum’ of standing consists of three elements.”
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).

“The plaintiff must have (1) suffered

an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged
conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed
by a favorable judicial decision.”
party

invoking

federal

Id.

jurisdiction,

establishing these elements.”

Id.

“The plaintiff, as the
bears

the

burden

of

“Since they are not mere

pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the
plaintiff’s case, each element must be supported in the same way
as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of
proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at
the successive stages of the litigation.”
U.S. at 561.

Defs. of Wildlife, 504

“In response to a summary judgment motion, however,

the plaintiff can no longer rest on such ‘mere allegations,’ but
must ‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts’”
supporting its standing.

Id.

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

Conversely, in order to grant summary judgment in a plaintiff’s
favor, there must be no genuine issue of material fact as to that
plaintiff’s standing.
Because

“the

standing

inquiry

requires

careful

judicial

examination of . . . whether the particular plaintiff is entitled
to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted,” Allen v.
17
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Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (emphasis added), standing must
be

assessed

as

to

each

plaintiff

and

each

“plaintiff

must

demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought,”
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000).

Further, because Article III does not

“permit[] suits against non-injurious defendants as long as one of
the defendants in the suit injured the plaintiff,” standing must
also be assessed as against each defendant.

Mahon v. Ticor Title

Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2012).
We

consider

the

three

elements

of

standing

as

to

the

individual plaintiffs before turning to the Knight Institute’s
standing.
A.

Injury-in-Fact

“To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he
or she suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that
is

concrete

and

particularized

and

actual

or

imminent,

not

conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (internal
quotation marks omitted).

However, “[p]ast exposure to illegal

conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy
regarding

injunctive

relief

. . .

continuing, present adverse effects.”
Lyons,

461

U.S.

95,

102

(1983)

if

unaccompanied

by

any

City of Los Angeles v.

(alteration

and

omission

in

original) (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96
(1974)).

Though “[p]ast wrongs” serve as “evidence bearing on
18
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whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury,”
id. (internal quotation marks omitted), “[a] plaintiff seeking
injunctive or declaratory relief cannot rely on past injury to
satisfy the injury requirement,” Deshawn E. ex rel. Charlotte E.
v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1998). Rather, that plaintiff
“must show a likelihood that he or she will be injured in the
Id.7

future.”

“Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept,
it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that
the

alleged

purposes.”

injury

is

not

too

speculative

for

Article

III

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)

(quoting Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2).

Therefore,

“threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending’ to constitute
injury

in

fact”

that

satisfies

Article

III’s

requirements.

Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (quoting Babbitt v.
United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)).

A

“theory of standing [that] relies on a highly attenuated chain of
possibilities[] does not satisfy the requirement that threatened
injury must be certainly impending,” nor does an “objectively
reasonable likelihood” that the injury will occur.

7

Clapper, 568

The absence of future injury also precludes a finding of redressability,
thereby defeating standing to seek injunctive relief on a second basis. See
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998) (“Because
[plaintiff] alleges only past infractions of [law], and not a continuing
violation or the likelihood of a future violation, injunctive relief will not
redress its injury.”).
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U.S. at 410 (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488,
496 (2009), and Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 157-60).
Further, the injury must be concrete and particularized. “For
an injury to be ‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect the plaintiff in
a personal and individual way.’”

Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548

(quoting Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1).

The plaintiff

“must have a personal stake in the outcome” and must assert
“something more than generalized grievances.”

United States v.

Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179-80 (1974) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

An “impact on him [that] is plainly undifferentiated

and common to all members of the public” is insufficient, id. at
176 (internal quotation marks omitted), as is a mere “special
interest” in a given problem without more, Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972).

At the same time, “standing is not to

be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury.”
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 n.24 (2007) (quoting United
States

v.

Students

Challenging

Regulatory

(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).

Agency

Procedures

“The fact that an injury may

be suffered by a large number of people does not of itself make
that injury a nonjusticiable generalized grievance.”

Spokeo, 136

S. Ct. at 1548 n.7.
Concreteness “is quite different from particularization.”
Id. at 1548.

“A ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de facto’; that is, it

must actually exist.” Id. The term “‘[c]oncrete’ is not, however,
20
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necessarily synonymous with ‘tangible,’” and “intangible injuries”
-- including infringements on the exercise of First Amendment
rights -- “can nevertheless be concrete.”

Id. at 1549 (citing

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009), and Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993)).
In this case, the record establishes a number of limitations
on the individual plaintiffs’ use of Twitter as a result of having
been blocked.

As long as they remain blocked, “the Individual

Plaintiffs cannot view the President’s tweets; directly reply to
these tweets; or use the @realDonaldTrump webpage to view the
comment threads associated with the President’s tweets while they
are logged in to their verified accounts.”

Stip. ¶ 54.

While

alternative means of viewing the President’s tweets exist, Stip.
¶¶ 55-56, and the individual plaintiffs “have the ability to view
and reply to replies to @realDonaldTrump tweets, they cannot see
the original @realDonaldTrump tweets themselves when signed in to
their blocked accounts, and in many instances it is difficult to
understand the reply tweets without the context of the original
@realDonaldTrump tweets,” Stip. ¶ 58.
These

limitations

are

cognizable

injuries-in-fact.

The

individual plaintiffs’ ability to communicate using Twitter has
been encumbered by these limitations (regardless of whether they
are harms cognizable under the First Amendment).
21
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as the individual plaintiffs remain blocked, their ability to
communicate using Twitter will continue to be so limited.
¶¶ 28-31, 54.

Stip.

The individual plaintiffs have experienced past

harm in that their ability to use Twitter to interact with the
President’s tweets has been limited, and -- absent some unforeseen
change to the blocking functionality -- they will continue to
experience that harm as long as they are blocked.

These future

harms are not only certainly impending as required for standing
purposes, but they are in fact virtually certain because the
individual plaintiffs continue to be blocked.8
These injuries are also concrete and particularized.

While

they are not tangible in nature, these limitations are squarely
within

the

concrete.

“intangible

injuries”

previously

See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.

determined

to

be

These limitations are

also particularized, in that they have affected and will affect
the individual plaintiffs in a “personal and individual way” -each contends that his or her personal First Amendment rights have
been and will continue to be encumbered, and the ability to
communicate has been and will be limited because of each individual

8 Further, the Court suggested at oral argument that the parties consider
a resolution of this dispute under which the individual plaintiffs would be
unblocked and subsequently muted, an approach that would restore the individual
plaintiffs’ ability to interact directly with (including by replying directly
to) tweets from the @realDonaldTrump account while preserving the President’s
ability to ignore tweets sent by users from whom he does not wish to hear. The
fact that no such resolution has been reached further suggests that the
individual plaintiffs will continue to be blocked and, consequently, will
continue to face the harms of which they complain.
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plaintiff’s personal ownership of a Twitter account that was
blocked.

See id. at 1548.

We accordingly conclude that the

individual plaintiffs have established imminent injury-in-fact
that is concrete and particularized, which is sufficient for
Article III standing purposes.
B.

Causation

The causation requirement demands that the complained-of
injury “fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the
defendant” as opposed to “injury that results from the independent
action of some third party not before the court.”
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976).

Simon v. E. Ky.

While the Supreme

Court has often defined the causation prong of standing with
reference to a defendant’s challenged action, it has also referred
to a defendant’s “conduct.”

See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian

Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).

Accordingly, an omission may

provide a basis for standing just as an affirmative action may.
See Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecomms., S.à.r.l.,
790 F.3d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 2015) (describing causation as requiring
“that the injury was in some sense caused by the opponent’s action
or

omission”);

see

also,

e.g.,

Elec.

Privacy

Info.

Ctr.

v.

Presidential Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity, 878 F.3d 371,

23
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378 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (referring to a “defendant’s action or
omission”).
“The traceability requirement for Article III standing means
that the plaintiff must ‘demonstrate a causal nexus between the
defendant’s conduct and the injury.’” Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708
F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d
148,

156

(2d

Cir.

1992)).

“Proximate

causation

is

not

a

requirement of Article III standing, which requires only that the
plaintiff’s
conduct.”

injury

be

fairly

traceable

to

the

defendant’s

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,

134 S. Ct. 1377, 1391 n.6 (2014).
1.

Sarah Huckabee Sanders

Plaintiffs have not established standing against defendant
Sanders. “Ms. Sanders does not have access to the @realDonaldTrump
account,” Stip. ¶ 11, and plaintiffs do not suggest that Sanders
blocked the individual plaintiffs in the first instance or that
she could unblock the individual plaintiffs upon a legal finding
that

such

blocking

is

constitutionally

impermissible.

Accordingly, plaintiffs do not challenge any action that Sanders
has taken (or can take).

The individual plaintiffs’ injuries-in-

fact are not attributable to Sanders, and they accordingly lack
Article III standing to sue her.
41-42.

See, e.g., Simon, 426 U.S. at

Summary judgment will therefore be granted in favor of

defendant Sanders.
24

SPA.24

Case
Case
1:17-cv-05205-NRB
18-1691, DocumentDocument
25, 08/07/2018,
72 Filed
2362018,
05/23/18
Page74
Pageof25124
of 75

2.

Daniel Scavino

In contrast to Sanders, “Mr. Scavino has access to the
@realDonaldTrump account, including the access necessary to block
and unblock individuals from the @realDonaldTrump account.”
¶ 12.

Stip.

Indeed, “Mr. Scavino posts messages on behalf of President

Trump to @realDonaldTrump and other social media accounts,” Stip.
¶ 12,

and

“assists

President

Trump

in

operating

the

@realDonaldTrump account, including by drafting and posting tweets
to the account,” Stip. ¶ 39.

While Scavino unquestionably has

access to the @realDonaldTrump account and participates in its
operation, such involvement does not, by itself, establish that
the plaintiffs’ injuries may be fairly traced to an action taken
by Scavino as required for standing purposes.

The only evidence

in the record as to Scavino pertains to this general involvement,
and the record is devoid of any suggestion that he blocked the
individual plaintiffs.
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit and several other Courts of
Appeals have recognized that in cases seeking prospective relief,
an official defendant’s lack of personal involvement in past
constitutional

violations

does

not

render

that

defendant

an

improper one for purposes of prospective declaratory or injunctive
relief from continuing violations -- provided that the defendant
maintains

some

connection

continuing violation.

to,

or

responsibility

for,

the

See Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86, 89 (2d
25
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Cir. 1996) (holding that “the complaint also sought injunctive
relief against [a defendant official], and dismissal of that claim
was not warranted” despite the “lack of an allegation of personal
involvement” warranting dismissal of a damages claim); Pugh v.
Goord, 571 F. Supp. 2d 477, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Sullivan, J.)
(requiring “only that a defendant have a ‘connection’ with the
[allegedly unconstitutional] act, and not more” (citing, inter
alia, Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. v. Nickel (In re Dairy
Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.), 411 F.3d 367, 372-73 (2d Cir.
2005))); Loren v. Levy, No. 00 Civ. 7687, 2003 WL 1702004, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2003) (Chin, J.) (“[A]ctions involving claims
for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief are permissible
provided the official against whom the action is brought has a
direct connection to, or responsibility for, the alleged illegal
action.” (quoting Davidson v. Scully, 148 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)), aff’d, 120 F. App’x 393 (2d Cir. 2005); see also
Parkell

v.

Danberg,

833

F.3d

313,

332

(3d

Cir.

2016)

(“Our

conclusion that the State Defendants lacked personal involvement
in past constitutional violations does not preclude [plaintiff]
from

obtaining

prospective

injunctive

relief

for

ongoing

violations.”); Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 576 (9th Cir. 2012)
(concluding that a named defendant official was a “proper defendant
on a claim for prospective injunctive relief . . . because he would
be responsible for ensuring that injunctive relief was carried
26
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out, even if he was not personally involved in the decision giving
rise to [plaintiff’s] claims”); Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d
311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“[S]ince [plaintiff] also
seeks injunctive relief it is irrelevant whether [the defendant
official] participated in the alleged violations.”).
While this line of cases developed in the context of suits
against state officials and the Ex parte Young exception to state
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, see In re Dairy
Mart, 411 F.3d at 372-73; see also Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d
1139, 1151 (10th Cir. 2007); Pennington Seed, Inc. v. Produce Exch.
No. 299, 457 F.3d 1334, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 2006), it is no less
applicable
officials.9

to

the

present

context

of

suits

against

federal

As the Supreme Court has explained, suits seeking

prospective relief against federal officials alleging continuing
constitutional violations and those against state officials share
common characteristics and a common historical basis: “we have
long held that federal courts may in some circumstances grant
injunctive relief against state officers who are violating, or
planning to violate, federal law.

But that has been true not only

with respect to violations of federal law by state officials, but
also

with

officials.”

respect

to

violations

of

federal

law

by

federal

Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct.

9 Both parties’ reliance on other precedents developed in the context of
suits against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 further persuades us that
this line of precedent is applicable here.
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1378, 1384 (2015) (citations omitted).

“The ability to sue to

enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers is
the creation of courts of equity, and reflects a long history of
judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing back to
England.”

Id. (emphasis added).

The lack of a prior personal involvement requirement in
actions seeking prospective relief does not vitiate standing’s
traceability requirement, as defendants suggest.
official’s

connection

to

the

ongoing

The defendant

violation,

see,

e.g.,

Parkell, 833 F.3d at 332; Pouncil, 704 F.3d at 576; Gonzalez, 663
F.3d

at

315;

Pugh,

571

traceability requirement.

F.

Supp.

2d

at

517,

satisfies

the

Assuming the existence of an ongoing

violation, an official who has some connection to the violation - i.e., one who may prospectively remedy it -- will contribute to
the violation and the future injury-in-fact that it may inflict by
failing to do so.

Here, assuming that the blocking of the

individual plaintiffs infringes their First Amendment rights,
those rights will continue to be infringed as long as they remain
blocked.

Cf. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102 (“[P]ast exposure to illegal

conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy
regarding
continuing,

injunctive
present

relief
adverse

. . .

if

effects.”

(quoting O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495-96)).

unaccompanied
(omission

in

by

any

original)

Because Scavino has the

ability to unblock the plaintiffs, any future injury will be
28
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traceable to him because it will have resulted, at least in part,
from his failure to unblock them.

Ultimately, as defendants’

quoted authority explains, “[s]tanding should be recognized as
long as the duty claim survives, but becomes irrelevant when
litigation reaches the point of rejecting the duty.”

13A Charles

A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure, § 3531.5 (3d ed.)
(Westlaw 2018).

Because we must consider standing before the

merits, we have not at this point in the analysis considered
plaintiffs’ claim that the First Amendment imposes a duty on
Scavino to unblock the individual plaintiffs.10

We therefore

conclude

standing

that

the

traceability

requirement

of

is

satisfied as to Scavino.
3.

The President

The record definitively establishes that the plaintiffs’
injuries-in-fact

are

actions.

President

“The

directly

traceable

blocked

[each

to
of

plaintiffs] from the @realDonaldTrump account.”

the
the

President’s
individual

Stip. ¶¶ 46-52;

see also Stip. ¶ 54 (referring to “the President’s blocking of the

10 Indeed, this passage of Federal Practice and Procedure suggests that a
plaintiff asserting a duty claim has standing as long as the claim remains
viable, and that the issue of standing becomes irrelevant when the duty is
rejected -- as the claim will have failed on the merits at that point. The
government’s argument that plaintiffs lack standing as to Scavino because
Scavino has no duty therefore inverts the analysis by resolving the merits
before standing. Cf. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (“[J]urisdiction . . . is not
defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause
of action on which petitioners could actually recover.” (omissions in original)
(quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)).
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Individual Plaintiffs”).

The causation requirement is therefore

amply satisfied as to the President.
C.

Redressability

In order for redressability to be satisfied, “it must be
likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress
the injury.”

Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. at 493.

That is,

redressability must be “likely, as opposed to merely speculative,”
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181, but it “is not a demand for mathematical
certainty,” Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581,
602 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Toll Bros., Inc. v. Township of
Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 143 (3d Cir. 2009)).

“All that is

required is a showing that such relief be reasonably designed to
improve the opportunities of a plaintiff not otherwise disabled to
avoid the specific injury alleged.”

Huntington Branch, NAACP v.

Town of Huntington, 689 F.2d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 1982).
Further, any relief provided need not be complete.

“The

redressability element of the Article III standing requirement and
the ‘complete relief’ referred to by Rule 19 [of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure] are not identical,” Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. at 570 n.4 (emphasis omitted) (plurality opinion),11 and a

11 Rule 19(a) mandates the joinder of additional persons as parties if “in
that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing
parties,” provided that the joinder of that party does “not deprive the court
of subject-matter jurisdiction.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A).
Justice
Blackmun, dissenting in Defenders of Wildlife, had contended that the
plurality’s analysis of redressability rendered superfluous Rule 19’s
contemplation that the joinder of additional parties would be needed to afford
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plaintiff “need not show that a favorable decision will relieve
his every injury,” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 n.15
(1982).

As the Tenth Circuit has subsequently explained, “if the

law required that the requested relief afford complete redress,
the Supreme Court would not have allowed Massachusetts to proceed
against the EPA, as there was no guarantee a favorable decision
would mitigate future environmental damage, much less redress it
completely.”

Consumer Data Indus. Ass’n v. King, 678 F.3d 898,

905 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at
526); see also WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 795
F.3d 1148, 1156 n.5 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Partial relief . . . would
qualify as redress for standing purposes.” (citing Meese v. Keene,
481 U.S. 465, 476-77 (1987))).

“[E]ven if [plaintiffs] would not

be out of the woods, a favorable decision would relieve their
problem ‘to some extent,’ which is all the law requires.” Consumer
Data, 678 F.3d at 903.
We therefore conclude that the plaintiffs’ injuries may be
redressed through declaratory relief or through injunctive relief
directed at Scavino: the plaintiffs’ future injuries will be
prevented if they are unblocked -- an action within Scavino’s
power.

Stip. ¶ 12.

defendants

suggest,

Nor is this redressability undercut, as
by

the

President’s

ability

to

block

complete relief, as redressability would be lacking as an initial matter.
504 U.S. at 598 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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individuals.

The D.C. Circuit has explained that “the partial

relief [the plaintiff] can obtain against subordinate executive
officials is sufficient for redressability, even recognizing that
the President has the power, if he so chose, to undercut this
relief,” Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 980-81 (D.C. Cir. 1996),
reasoning that has since been adopted by the Eleventh Circuit, see
Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1309-11
(11th Cir. 2001).

Any declaratory or injunctive relief as to

Scavino that results in the unblocking of the individual plaintiffs
will redress at least some of their future injury, regardless of
whether

the

subsequently.

President

could,

theoretically,

reblock

them

And of course, “we may assume it is substantially

likely that the President and other executive . . . officials would
abide

by

an

authoritative

interpretation

of

[a]

. . .

constitutional provision by the District Court, even though they
would not be directly bound by such a determination.”

Franklin v.

Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 803 (1992) (plurality opinion); see
also Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 463-64 (2002).12 This substantial
likelihood, though not a mathematical certainty, is more than

12

This case involves the interpretation of only one law -- the First
Amendment.
The Government’s reliance on Delta Construction Co. v. EPA, 783
F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam), and Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105 (2d
Cir. 2014), each of which involved a plaintiff or petitioner subject to the
requirements of multiple laws, is accordingly misplaced.
In each of those
cases, the action that the plaintiff or petitioner sought to undertake would be
restricted by the unchallenged law, even if the plaintiff or petitioner were
ultimately successful in challenging the first law.
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sufficient

to

establish

the

redressability

of

plaintiffs’

injuries.13
D.

The Knight Institute’s Organizational Standing

“Under

[the]

theory

of

‘organizational’

standing,

the

organization is just another person -- albeit a legal person -seeking to vindicate a right.”

N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v.

N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 294 (2d Cir. 2012).14

When

organizations “sue on their own behalf, they must independently
satisfy the requirements of Article III standing.”

Knife Rights,

Inc. v. Vance, 802 F.3d 377, 388 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378–79 (1982)).

Therefore,

the Knight Institute, “as an organization, [bears] the burden of
showing:

(i)

an

imminent

‘injury

in

fact’

to

itself

as

an

organization (rather than to its members) that is ‘distinct and

13 Our conclusion that the individual plaintiffs’ injuries are redressable
through relief directed at Scavino does not depend on his presence as a
defendant.
“The power conferred by the [All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651,]
extends, under appropriate circumstances, to persons who, though not parties to
the original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate
the implementation of a court order or the proper administration of justice,
and encompasses even those who have not taken any affirmative action to hinder
justice.” United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977) (citations
omitted); see also Made in the USA, 242 F.3d at 1310 n.25; Swan, 100 F.3d at
980; cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2) (providing that injunctions and restraining
orders bind not only the parties but also their “officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys” and “other persons who are in active concert or
participation” with those persons). Accordingly, even if Scavino were not a
defendant, relief could nonetheless be properly directed at him.
14 An organizational plaintiff may also have associational standing, under
which “[a]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members
when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the
interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and neither the
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit.” Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181. The Knight Institute does
not assert that it has standing under an associational standing theory.
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palpable’; (ii) that its injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to [the
complained-of act]; and (iii) that a favorable decision would
redress its injuries.”

Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust

Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 868 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2017)
(quoting Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2011)).
Here, the Knight Institute has sufficiently established an
injury-in-fact: the infringement of its desire “to read comments
that otherwise would have been posted by the blocked Plaintiffs
. . . in direct reply to @realDonaldTrump tweets.”

Stip. ¶ 61.

This infringement is a cognizable interest for standing purposes,
cf. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562-63 (“[T]he desire to use or
observe . . . is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of
standing”), and the Knight Institute’s following of one of the
individual plaintiffs establishes that the Knight Institute “would
thereby be ‘directly’ affected apart from” its special interest in
the First Amendment, id. at 563. Contrary to defendants’ assertion
that the Knight Institute’s standing rests on an impermissibly
attenuated chain of possibilities, the injury in question is
straightforward: first, the individual plaintiffs cannot reply
directly to the President’s tweets because they have been blocked,
Stip. ¶¶ 28, 54, and second, the Knight Foundation possesses a
desire to read the direct replies that would have been tweeted,
Stip. ¶ 61.
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Defendants further contend that the Knight Institute has
suffered a noncognizable generalized grievance, but nothing in the
record suggests that the citizenry writ large desires to read the
individual plaintiffs’ tweets engaging with the President’s tweets
as the Knight Institute does.15

Even assuming a large number of

other individuals share such a desire, that numerosity would not
render the Knight Institute’s injury a generalized grievance that
cannot support Article III standing.

See, e.g., Spokeo, 136 S.

Ct. at 1548 n.7; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 526 n.24.
And

even

assuming

arguendo

that

the

Knight

Institute’s

assertion of its desire to view the individual plaintiffs’ tweets
standing alone is insufficient to support standing, see, e.g.,
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562-64; Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 886-89 (1990), any insufficiency is remedied
by the fact that the Knight Institute did and does follow one of
the individual plaintiffs, Stip. ¶ 62.

Defendants correctly note

that the Knight Institute did not follow on Twitter six of the
seven individual plaintiffs’ accounts (as of one month after this
lawsuit

was

filed),

Stip.

¶ 62,

but

the

Knight

Institute’s

following of one of the individual plaintiffs is significant and
represents “dispositively more than the mere ‘general averments’
and ‘conclusory allegations’ found inadequate in National Wildlife
Federation,” Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184 (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n,

15

We would in fact be highly skeptical of any such contention.
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497 U.S. at 888), and comparable cases.
that

the

Knight

Institute

has

We therefore conclude

established

an

injury-in-fact

necessary to support its organizational standing.
The causation and redressability elements of standing are
also satisfied as to the Knight Institute.

The causation analysis

as to the Knight Institute largely follows that applicable to the
individual

plaintiffs:

the

Knight

Institute’s

injury

--

the

inability to read the individual plaintiffs’ direct replies to the
President’s tweets -- is a direct consequence of the individual
plaintiffs being unable to reply directly to the President’s
tweets, which is, in turn, a direct consequence of the individual
plaintiffs having been blocked.

Stip. ¶¶ 28, 54, 59, 61.

The

Knight Institute’s injuries are similarly redressable -- if the
individual plaintiffs were unblocked, they would be able to tweet
direct replies to tweets sent by @realDonaldTrump and the Knight
Institute would again be able to fulfill its desire to read those
direct replies.

While the individual plaintiffs would need to

choose to reply in order for the Knight Institute to read a reply,
certain individual plaintiffs’ attempts to circumvent blocking’s
limitation on direct replies, Stip. ¶ 59, and the individual
plaintiffs’ identification of the burdens posed by blocking as
prompting their reduced engagement, Stip. ¶ 60, strongly suggests
that at least some of the individual plaintiffs are likely to reply
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if they were to have the capacity to do so.

Accordingly, we

conclude that the Knight Institute also has standing.
III. First Amendment
Concluding that the individual plaintiffs and the Knight
Institute both have standing to sue Scavino and the President, we
turn to the First Amendment’s application to the distinctly twentyfirst century medium of Twitter.

The primary point of dispute

between the parties is whether a public official’s blocking of the
individual plaintiffs on Twitter implicates a forum for First
Amendment purposes.

Our analysis of this question proceeds in

several steps.
“[W]e must first decide whether” the speech in which the
individual plaintiffs seek to engage “is speech protected by the
First Amendment.”

Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund,

Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985); see also Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (ISKCON), 505 U.S. 672, 677 (1992).

A

conclusion that individual plaintiffs’ speech is protected speech,
however, “merely begins our inquiry.”

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799.

We must then assess whether the putative forum is susceptible to
forum analysis at all, see Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes,
523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) (“Other government properties are . . .
not fora at all.”); see also Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 480
(identifying when “forum analysis is out of place”), identifying
with particularity the putative forum at issue, see Cornelius, 473
37
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U.S. at 800.

If so, we must then determine its classification.

Id. (“Having defined the relevant forum, we must then determine
whether it is public or nonpublic in nature.”).16

To the extent

we conclude that a First Amendment forum is implicated, we consider
whether “the extent to which the Government [has] control[led]
access” is consistent with the class of forum identified.
A.

Id.

Protected Speech

Our inquiry into whether the speech at issue is protected by
the First Amendment is straightforward.

The individual plaintiffs

seek to engage in political speech, Stip. ¶¶ 46-52, and such
“speech on matters of public concern” “fall within the core of
First Amendment protection,” Engquist v. Ore. Dep’t of Agric., 553
U.S. 591, 600 (2008).

Indeed, there is no suggestion that the

speech in which the individual plaintiffs engaged and seek to
engage fall within the “well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech,” such as obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and
speech

integral

punishment

of

to

which

criminal
have

Constitutional problem.”

conduct,

never

been

“the
thought

prevention
to

raise

and
any

Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S.

786, 791 (2011) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942)); see also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.

16 That is, the question of whether a space is susceptible to forum
analysis is analytically distinct from the question, assuming that forum
analysis applies, of what type of forum (traditional public, designated public,
or non-public) the space is.
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460,

468

(2010).

We

readily

conclude

the

speech

in

which

individual plaintiffs seek to engage is protected speech.
B.

Applicability of Forum Doctrine

We turn next to the applicability of forum doctrine.

As a

threshold matter, for a space to be susceptible to forum analysis,
it must be owned or controlled by the government.

See, e.g.,

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801 (“[A] speaker must seek access to public
property or to private property dedicated to public use to evoke
First Amendment concerns.”).

Further, the application of forum

doctrine must be consistent with the purpose, structure, and
intended use of the space.

See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City, 555

U.S. at 480 (“[W]here the application of forum analysis would lead
almost inexorably to closing of the forum, it is obvious that forum
analysis is out of place.”).
The Supreme Court has instructed that in determining whether
these requirements are satisfied (i.e., whether forum analysis can
be appropriately applied), we should identify the putative forum
by “focus[ing] on the access sought by the speaker.”

Cornelius,

473 U.S. at 801; see Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak),
69 F.3d 650, 655 (2d Cir. 1995).

“When speakers seek general

access to public property, the forum encompasses that property.”
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801.

By contrast, “[i]n cases in which

limited access is sought, [the Supreme Court’s] cases have taken
a more tailored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a
39
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forum.”

Id.

For example, in Cornelius, where plaintiffs sought

access to a fundraising drive conducted in the federal workplace,
the

fundraising

workplace

drive

generally,

specifically,
constituted

rather

the

than

would-be

the

federal

forum.

Id.

Similarly, in Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’
Ass’n, where the plaintiff sought access to a public school’s
internal mail system in order to distribute literature, the mail
system rather than the school was the space in question.
37, 46-47 (1983).

460 U.S.

And in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, where

the plaintiff sought access to advertising space on the side of
city buses, the advertising space and not the buses constituted
the putative forum.

418 U.S. 298, 300-01 (1974).

Indeed, this

exercise in carefully delineating the putative forum based on the
access sought is not an academic one.

For instance, a public park

is susceptible to forum analysis when “used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions,” Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague
v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of
Roberts,

J.)),

but

the

same

public

park

is

not

when

“the

installation of permanent monuments” is concerned, Pleasant Grove
City, 555 U.S. at 480.
We can therefore reject, at the outset, any contention that
the @realDonaldTrump account as a whole is the would-be forum to
be analyzed.

Plaintiffs do not seek access to the account as a
40
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whole -- they do not desire the ability to send tweets as the
President, the ability to receive notifications that the President
would receive, or the ability to decide who the President follows
on Twitter.

Because the access they seek is far narrower, we

consider whether forum doctrine can be appropriately applied to
several aspects of the @realDonaldTrump account rather than the
account as a whole: the content of the tweets sent, the timeline
comprised of those tweets, the comment threads initiated by each
of those tweets, and the “interactive space” associated with each
tweet in which other users may directly interact with the content
of the tweets by, for example, replying to, retweeting, or liking
the tweet.
1.

Government Ownership or Control

First, to potentially qualify as a forum, the space in
question must be owned or controlled by the government.
Supreme

Court

has

frequently

referred

to

While the

“government-owned

property,” e.g., Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 478; see also
ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 678 (referring to property that the government
“owns and controls”), its precedents have also made clear that a
space may be a forum based on government control even absent legal
ownership, see, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010) (“[T]his Court has
employed forum analysis to determine when a governmental entity,
in regulating property in its charge, may place limitations on
41
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speech.” (emphasis added)); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801 (“[A]
speaker must seek access to public property or to private property
dedicated

to

public

use

to

evoke

First

Amendment

concerns.”

(emphasis added)); Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 (“[T]he ‘First
Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it
is owned or controlled by the government.’” (emphasis added)
(quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns,
453 U.S. 114, 130 (1981))); see also Se. Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (concluding that a “privately
owned . . . theater under long-term lease to the city,” id. at
547, was a public forum, id. at 555).

This requirement of

governmental control, rather than complete governmental ownership,
is not only consistent with forum analysis’s focus on “the extent
to which the Government can control access” to the space and
whether that control comports with the First Amendment, Cornelius,
473 U.S. at 800, but also better reflects that a space can be “a
forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic
sense,” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 830 (1995), and may “lack[] a physical situs,” Cornelius,
473

U.S.

at

801,

in

which

case

traditional

conceptions

of

“ownership” may fit less well.
Here, the government-control prong of the analysis is met.
Though Twitter is a private (though publicly traded) company that
is not government-owned, the President and Scavino nonetheless
42
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exercise control over various aspects of the @realDonaldTrump
account: they control the content of the tweets that are sent from
the account and they hold the ability to prevent, through blocking,
other Twitter users, including the individual plaintiffs here,
from accessing the @realDonaldTrump timeline (while logged into
the blocked account) and from participating in the interactive
space associated with the tweets sent by the @realDonaldTrump
account, Stip. ¶¶ 12, 28-32, 39, 54. Though Twitter also maintains
control over the @realDonaldTrump account (and all other Twitter
accounts), we nonetheless conclude that the extent to which the
President and Scavino can, and do, exercise control over aspects
of the @realDonaldTrump account are sufficient to establish the
government-control element as to the content of the tweets sent by
the @realDonaldTrump account, the timeline compiling those tweets,
and the interactive space associated with each of those tweets.
While their control does not extend to the content of a retweet or
reply when made -- “[n]o other Twitter user can alter the content
of any retweet or reply, either before or after it is posted” and
a user “cannot prescreen tweets, replies, likes, or mentions that
reference their tweets or accounts,” Stip. ¶ 26 -- it nonetheless
extends to controlling who has the power to retweet or reply in
the first instance.
The President and Scavino’s control over the @realDonaldTrump
account is also governmental.

The record establishes (1) that the
43
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@realDonaldTrump account is presented as being “registered to
Donald J. Trump, ‘45th President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.,’” Stip. ¶ 35; (2) “that the President’s tweets
from @realDonaldTrump . . . are official records that must be
preserved under the Presidential Records Act,” Stip. ¶ 40; see 44
U.S.C. § 2202 (directing the retention of “Presidential records”;
id. § 2201(2) (defining “Presidential records” as those created
“in the course of conducting activities which relate to or have an
effect upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or
other official or ceremonial duties of the President”); and (3)
that the @realDonaldTrump account has been used in the course of
the appointment of officers (including cabinet secretaries), the
removal of officers, and the conduct of foreign policy, Stip. ¶ 38
-- all of which are squarely executive functions, see U.S. Const.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (appointments); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492-93 (2010) (relating
the President’s removal power to “his responsibility to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed” under Article II, section 3,
clause 5 of the Constitution (emphasis omitted)); Zivotofsky ex
rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015) (“The
President does have a unique role in communicating with foreign
governments

. . . .”).

@realDonaldTrump

account

That
as

is,

the

President

presents

being

a

presidential

account

the
as

opposed to a personal account and, more importantly, uses the
44
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account to take actions that can be taken only by the President as
President.

Accordingly, we conclude that the control that the

President and Scavino exercise over the account and certain of its
features is governmental in nature.
Defendants contend that the governmental control-or-ownership
prong is not met because we must also analyze the specific action
in question -- blocking -- under the “under color of state law”
precedents developed in the context of actions against state
officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In that context, the standards

for whether an action was taken “under color of state law” and for
whether an action constitutes “state action” are identical, see
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982), and an
official takes action under color of state law when he “exercise[s]
power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’”
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).

Invoking this standard,

defendants contend that the act of blocking is not state action
triggering

First

Amendment

scrutiny

because

blocking

is

a

functionality made available to every Twitter user, Stip. ¶ 28,
and is therefore not a power possessed by virtue of state law.
While the Constitution applies only to the government and not
private individuals, the requirement of state action in the forum
context is not usually analyzed separately (either in general or
45
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under the West standard specifically) from the government controlor-ownership requirement.

As the Second Circuit has recently

explained, “[b]ecause facilities or locations deemed to be public
forums are usually operated by governments, determining that a
particular facility or location is a public forum usually suffices
to render the challenged action taken there to be state action
subject to First Amendment limitations.”

Halleck v. Manhattan

Cmty. Access Corp., 882 F.3d 300, 306–07 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265-68 (1981), and City of
Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisc. Emp’t Relations Comm’n,
429 U.S. 167, 169-76 (1976)).

While further analysis may be

necessary when the party exercising control over the forum is a
nongovernmental entity, see, e.g., id. at 307, in which case
consideration of the factors set forth by the Supreme Court in
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n,
531 U.S. 288, 295-96 (2001), may be appropriate, the Brentwood
factors are a poor fit for the facts of this case: the parties
exercising control here are a public official, the President, and
his subordinate, Scavino, acting in his official capacity.17

17

In Brentwood, the Supreme Court considered whether “a not-for-profit
membership corporation organized to regulate interscholastic sport among the
public and private high schools” engaged in state action when it enforced its
regulations against a member school. 531 U.S. at 291. The Court held that
“state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus
between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior
‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself,’” but acknowledged that
“[w]hat is fairly attributable is a matter of normative judgment, and the
criteria lack rigid simplicity.” Id. at 295 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison
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Further, this argument, which focuses on the act of exclusion
divorced from the context of the space from which a person is being
excluded, proves too much and is difficult to reconcile with the
Supreme Court’s public forum precedents.

Defendants correctly

argue that blocking is a capability held by every Twitter user,
Stip. ¶ 28, but the power to exclude is also one afforded generally
to every property owner.

When a government acts to “legally

preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
dedicated,” it behaves “like the private owner of property.”
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829; Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390 (1993); see also, e.g., Greer
v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (“The State, no less than a private
owner of property, has the power to preserve the property under
its control . . . .”).

Indeed, when the government exercises its

“right to exclude others from entering and using [its] property,”
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005), it is
deploying “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as property,” Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994). The right to exclude is “perhaps
the most fundamental of all property interests,” Lingle, 544 U.S.

Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1976)). After analyzing a number of factors, including
(1) whether the private actor was acting pursuant to the state’s coercive power,
(2) whether the private actor was undertaking a public function, and (3) whether
the private actor received significant encouragement from the state or whether
its functions were entwined with governmental policies, the Court concluded
that state action was present. See id. at 295-96; see also Sybalski v. Indep.
Grp. Home Living Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(analyzing Brentwood).
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at 539, and it is one shared by the government and private property
owners

alike.

The

context

of

the

property

from

which

the

government is excluding, therefore, must factor into the analysis.
No one can seriously contend that a public official’s blocking of
a constituent from her purely personal Twitter account -- one that
she does not impress with the trappings of her office and does not
use to exercise the authority of her position -- would implicate
forum analysis, but those are hardly the facts of this case.
For the same reason, defendants’ reliance on the President’s
establishment of the account in 2009, Stip. ¶ 32 -- well before
his election and inauguration as President -- is unpersuasive.

To

the

of

extent

forum

analysis

applies,

“[t]he

past

history

characterization of a forum may well be relevant; but that does
not

mean

a

disregarded.”

present

characterization

about

a

forum

may

be

Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 77

(1st Cir. 2004); see Make the Rd. by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378
F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2004) (recognizing that certain First
Amendment restrictions apply “so long as a forum remains public”);
cf. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d 30, 41 (2d
Cir. 2011) (reasoning that “the nature of the site changes”
depending on how the site is being used).

The Supreme Court has

expressly held that “a state is not required to indefinitely retain
the open character of the facility,” e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460
U.S. at 46, but changes need not be one-directional.
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entire concept of a designated public forum rests on the premise
that the nature of a (previously closed) space has been changed.
See, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
To take two examples, if a facility initially developed by
the government as a military base -- plainly not a public forum
under Greer, 424 U.S. at 838 -- is subsequently decommissioned and
repurposed into a public park,18 the present use of the facility
as a park would bear much more heavily on the forum analysis than
its historical origins as a military installation.

Similarly, if

a privately constructed airport were subsequently taken over by a
public agency, forum analysis would focus on its current use as a
public airport rather than its prior use as a private one.
ISKCON,

505

U.S.

at

681

(“The

practices

of

privately

Cf.
held

transportation centers do not bear on the government’s regulatory
authority over a publicly owned airport.”).
Here,

the

President

and

Scavino’s

present

use

of

the

@realDonaldTrump account weighs far more heavily in the analysis
than the origin of the account as the creation of private citizen
Donald Trump.

That latter fact cannot be given the dispositive

weight that defendants would ascribe to it.
President

and

Scavino

use

the

Rather, because the

@realDonaldTrump

account

for

18 Cf. Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t v. United States, No. 17-cv2223, 2018 WL 1152264, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 5, 2008) (describing the creation
of a national wildlife refuge from portions of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal).
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governmental functions, the control they exercise over it is
accordingly governmental in nature.
That control, however, does not extend to the comment thread
initiated by a tweet sent by the @realDonaldTrump account.

The

comment thread -- consisting of the initial tweet, direct replies
to that tweet, and second-order (and higher-order) replies to those
replies -- therefore cannot be a putative forum.

While the

President and Scavino can control the interactive space by limiting
who may directly reply or retweet a tweet initially sent by the
@realDonaldTrump account, they lack comparable control over the
subsequent

dialogue

in

the

comment

thread.

As

plaintiffs

acknowledge, even the individual plaintiffs who have been blocked
“can view replies to @realDonaldTrump tweets, and can post replies
to those replies, while logged in to the blocked accounts,” and
that these “[r]eplies-to-replies appear in the comment threads
that originate with @realDonaldTrump tweets.” Stip. ¶ 57. Because
a Twitter user lacks control over the comment thread beyond the
control exercised over first-order replies through blocking, the
comment threads -- as distinguished from the content of tweets
sent by @realDonaldTrump, the @realDonaldTrump timeline, and the
interactive space associated with each tweet -- do not meet the
threshold criterion for being a forum.
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2.

Purpose, Structure, and Intended Use

We next assess whether application of forum analysis is
consistent with the purpose, structure, and intended use of the
three aspects of the @realDonaldTrump account that we have found
to

satisfy

the

government

control-or-ownership

criterion:

specifically, the content of tweets, the timeline comprised of the
account’s tweets, and the interactive space of each tweet.
Generally,

“[t]he

forum

doctrine

has

been

applied

in

situations in which government-owned property or a government
program was capable of accommodating a large number of public
speakers without defeating the essential function of the land or
the program.”

Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 478.

By contrast,

forum analysis is not appropriately applied when “the government
has broad discretion to make content-based judgments in deciding
what private speech to make available to the public.”

United

States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 204 (2003) (plurality
opinion).

For example, the Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen a

public broadcaster exercises editorial discretion in the selection
and presentation of its programming,” its decisions are not subject
to forum analysis.

Forbes, 523 U.S. at 674.

Forum analysis was

inappropriate, the Court reasoned, because “[c]laims of access
under [the Court’s] public forum precedents could obstruct the
legitimate purposes of television broadcasters.”

Id.

“[B]road

rights of access for outside speakers would be antithetical, as a
51
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general rule, to the discretion that stations and their editorial
staff must exercise to fulfill their journalistic purpose and
statutory obligations.”

Id. at 673.

Similarly, the Supreme Court

has declined to apply forum analysis to a grant program operated
by the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), reasoning that “[t]he
NEA’s mandate is to make esthetic judgments” and the application
of an “inherently content-based ‘excellence’ threshold for NEA
support.”

Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,

586 (1998).

And applying Forbes and Finley, a four-Justice

plurality of the Supreme Court concluded that the internet access
provided by public libraries was not susceptible to forum analysis,
as forum analysis was “incompatible with the discretion that public
libraries must have to fulfill their traditional missions,” which
involve the “exercise of judgment in selecting the material [the
library] provides to its patrons.”
205 (plurality opinion).19

Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at

Ultimately, “where the application of

forum analysis would lead almost inexorably to closing of the
forum,

it

is

obvious

that

forum

analysis

is

out

of

place.”

Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 480.
Government speech is one category of speech that falls outside
the domain of forum analysis: when the government “is speaking on
its own behalf, the First Amendment strictures that attend the

19
Additionally, Justice Breyer agreed that forum analysis was not
applicable to the provision of internet access in public libraries. See Am.
Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 215-16 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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various types of government-established forums do not apply.”
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015).

“The Free Speech Clause restricts [only]

government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate
government speech.”

Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 467.

However, “[t]here may be situations in which it is difficult
to tell whether a government entity is speaking on its own behalf
or is providing a forum for private speech.”

Id. at 470.

Private

involvement in the formulation of the speech in question does not
preclude the conclusion that it is government speech. For example,
Pleasant Grove City concluded that monuments that were privately
financed but subsequently accepted by a municipal government and
displayed on public park land was government speech, see id. at
470-71, and Walker held that specialty license plate designs
proposed by private groups but approved and issued by a state
department of motor vehicles was also government speech, see 135
S. Ct. at 2248-50.

Conversely, “speech that is otherwise private

does not become speech of the government merely because the
government provides a forum for the speech or in some way allows
or facilitates it.”

Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20,

34 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 811-13).
In assessing whether speech constitutes government speech as
opposed to private speech, the Supreme Court has considered at
least three factors: whether government has historically used the
53
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speech in question “to convey state messages,” whether that speech
is

“often

closely

identified

in

the

public

mind”

with

the

government, and the extent to which government “maintain[s] direct
control over the messages conveyed,” with Walker’s application of
these factors “likely mark[ing] the outer bounds of the governmentspeech doctrine.”

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017)

(quoting Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2246-49); see also Wandering Dago,
879 F.3d at 34 (distilling the same three factors from Walker).
Based on the government speech doctrine, we reject out of
hand any contention that the content of the President’s tweets are
susceptible to forum analysis.

It is not so susceptible because

the content is government speech: the record establishes that the
President, sometimes “[w]ith the assistance of Mr. Scavino,” uses
the content of his tweets “to announce, describe, and defend his
policies; to promote his Administration’s legislative agenda; to
announce official decisions; to engage with foreign political
leaders;

to

publicize

state

visits;

to

challenge

media

organizations whose coverage of his Administration he believes to
be

unfair;

and

for

other

statements,

including

on

statements unrelated to official government business.”
¶ 38.

occasion
Stip.

Indeed, the content of the tweets sent by @realDonaldTrump

are solely the speech of the President or of other government
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officials.

Stip. ¶ 39.20

For the same reason, the account’s

timeline, which “displays all tweets generated by the [account]”
is

not

susceptible

to

forum

analysis:

the

timeline

merely

aggregates the content of all of the account’s tweets, Stip. ¶ 15,
all of which is government speech.
The same cannot be said, however, of the interactive space
for

replies

and

retweets

@realDonaldTrump account.

created

by

each

tweet

sent

by

the

At minimum, as to replies, they are

most directly associated with the replying user rather than the
sender of the tweet being replied to: a reply tweet appears with
the picture, name, and handle of the replying user, Stip. ¶¶ 23,
57, and appears most prominently in the timeline of the replying
user, Stip. ¶ 22.

Replying tweets are “controlled by the user who

generates them,” and “[n]o other Twitter user can alter the content
of any . . . reply, either before or after it is posted.”
¶ 26.

Stip.

Given the prominence with which the account information of

the replying user is displayed in the replying tweet, the reply is
unlikely to be “closely identified in the public mind” with the
sender, even when the sender of the tweet being replied to is a

20
Whether the content of retweets initially sent by other users
constitutes government speech presents a somewhat closer question. The content
of a retweet of a tweet sent by another governmental account, Stip. ¶ 37, is
still squarely government speech. The content of the retweet of a tweet sent
by a private non-governmental account, Stip. ¶ 39, would still likely be
government speech.
Despite the private genesis of the content, the act of
retweeting by @realDonaldTrump resembles the government’s acceptance of the
monuments in Pleasant Grove and the government’s approval of the license plate
designs in Walker, which were sufficient to render the privately originated
speech governmental in nature.
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governmental one.
at 2248.

Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1760; Walker, 135 S. Ct.

And, far from “maintain[ing] direct control over the

messages conveyed” in a user’s replies to the President’s tweets
(assuming the user retains the ability to reply, i.e., the user
has not been blocked), the government maintains no control over
the content of the reply.

Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1760; Walker, 135

S.

together,

Ct.

at

2249.

Taken

these

factors

support

the

conclusion that replies to the President’s tweets remain the
private speech of the replying user.

The association that a reply

has with a governmental sender of the tweet being replied to -the

indication

that

the

replying

tweet

is

a

reply

and

its

appearance in the comment thread accessed from the timeline of the
governmental sender -- is not sufficient to render the reply
government speech.21
Nor is the interactive space of each tweet, as distinguished
from the content of the tweet, constrained by the notions of
inherent selectivity and scarcity that the Supreme Court held to
counsel against the application of forum doctrine in Finley and
Forbes and in Pleasant Grove City, respectively.

Generally, no

selection is involved in determining who has the ability to

21

Retweets again present a closer question. A retweet appears “in the
same form as it did on the original [sender]’s timeline,” with the name, picture,
and handle of the original sender rather than the retweeter, and with an
additional “notation indicating that the post was retweeted” above the tweet in
smaller font.
Stip. ¶ 21.
Nonetheless, in the same way the President’s
retweeting of a tweet sent by a private individual likely renders the
President’s retweet government speech, a private individual’s retweet of a tweet
sent by the President is likely private speech rather than government speech.
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interact

directly

with

the

President’s

tweets:

the

@realDonaldTrump account is “generally accessible to the public at
large without regard to political affiliation or any other limiting
criteria,” such that any Twitter user who has not been blocked may
so engage.

Stip. ¶ 36.

Indeed, just as “a park can accommodate

many speakers and, over time, many parades and demonstrations”;
“[t]he Combined Federal Campaign permits hundreds of groups to
solicit donations from federal employees” as in Cornelius; “[a]
public university’s student activity fund can provide money for
many campus activities” as in Rosenberger; “a public university’s
buildings may offer meeting space for hundreds of student groups”
as in Widmar; and “[a] school system’s internal mail facilities
can support the transmission of many messages to and from teachers
and school administrators” as in Perry Education Ass’n, Pleasant
Grove City, 555 U.S. at 478, the interactive space of a tweet can
accommodate an unlimited number of replies and retweets.

Indeed,

the record establishes that tweets sent by the @realDonaldTrump
account regularly attract tens of thousands, if not hundreds of
thousands, of replies and retweets, Stip. ¶¶ 41-43, and nothing
suggests

that

the

“application

of

forum

analysis”

to

the

interactive space associated with a tweet “would lead almost
inexorably to closing of the forum,” id. at 480.

Rather, the

interactive space is “capable of accommodating a large number of
public speakers without defeating [its] essential function,” id.
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at 478; and indeed, the essential function of a given tweet’s
interactive space is to allow private speakers to engage with the
content of the tweet, Stip. ¶ 13, which supports the application
of forum analysis.
Ultimately, the delineation of a tweet’s interactive space as
the putative forum is consistent with the Supreme Court’s directive
to “focus[] on the access sought by the speaker.”
U.S. at 801.

Cornelius, 473

When a user is blocked, the most significant

impediment is the ability to directly interact with a tweet sent
by the blocking user.

While a blocked user is also limited in

that the user may not view the content of the blocking user’s
tweets or view the blocking user’s timeline, those limitations may
be circumvented entirely by “using an internet browser or other
application that is not logged in to Twitter, or that is logged in
to a Twitter account that is not blocked.”

Stip. ¶ 55.

By

contrast, the ability to interact directly cannot be completely
reestablished, Stip. ¶¶ 54, 58-59, and that ability -- i.e., access
to the interactive space -- is therefore best described as the
access that the individual plaintiffs seek.
In sum, we conclude that the interactive space associated
with each of the President’s tweets is not government speech and
is properly analyzed under the Supreme Court’s forum precedents.
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C.

Classification

Having concluded that forum analysis is appropriately applied
to the interactive space associated with a tweet, we turn to the
question of classification.

“The Supreme Court has recognized

three types of fora across a spectrum of constitutional protection
for expressive activity.”

Make the Rd., 378 F.3d at 142.

First,

traditional public fora are “places which by long tradition or by
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.”

Perry

Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. These spaces, like streets and parks,
“have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public,
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.”

Id. (quoting Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (opinion of

Roberts, J.)).

Absent a well-established history of dedication

to public use, however, a forum cannot be a traditional public
forum.

The Supreme Court has “rejected the view that traditional

public forum status extends beyond its historic confines.” Forbes,
523 U.S. at 678 (citing ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 680-81).
“A second category consists of public property which the state
has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive
activity.”

Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.

“To create a forum

of this type, the government must intend to make the property
‘generally available,’ to a class of speakers.”

Forbes, 523 U.S.

at 678 (citations omitted) (quoting Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264). “The
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government does not create a public forum by inaction or by
permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a
nontraditional forum for public discourse,” and we “look[] to the
policy and practice of the government to ascertain whether it
intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly
and debate as a public forum.”

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.

Finally, a space that is susceptible to forum analysis but is “not
by tradition or designation a forum for public communication,”
Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46, is termed a “nonpublic forum,”
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677.
Applying this three-part classification framework to the
interactive space, we can first conclude that the interactive space
of a tweet sent by @realDonaldTrump is not a traditional public
forum.

There is no historical practice of the interactive space

of a tweet being used for public speech and debate since time
immemorial, for there is simply no extended historical practice as
to the medium of Twitter.

While the Supreme Court has referenced

the “vast democratic forums of the Internet,” Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, 868 (1997), has described the internet (including social
media platforms such as Twitter) as one of “the most important
places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views,” Packingham
v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017), and has analogized
the internet to the “essential venues for public gatherings” of
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streets

and

parks,

id.,

the

lack

of

historical

practice

is

dispositive, see Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678.
Accordingly, we consider whether the interactive space is a
designated public forum, with “governmental intent” serving as
“the touchstone for determining whether a public forum has been
created.”

Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cohen, 131 F.3d 273, 279

(2d Cir. 1997).

“Intent is not merely a matter of stated purpose.

Indeed, it must be inferred from a number of objective factors,
including: [the government’s] policy and past practice, as well as
the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive
activity.”

Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir.

1991) (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802-03).
Here, these factors strongly support the conclusion that the
interactive

space

is

a

designated

public

forum.

“The

@realDonaldTrump account is generally accessible to the public at
large without regard to political affiliation or any other limiting
criteria,” “any member of the public can view his tweets,” and
“anyone [with a Twitter account] who wants to follow the account
[on Twitter] can do so,” unless that person has been blocked.
Stip. ¶ 36.

Similarly, anyone with a Twitter account who has not

been blocked may participate in the interactive space by replying
or retweeting the President’s tweets.

Stip. ¶¶ 21, 22, 28, 36.

Further, the account -- including all of its constituent components
-- has been held out by Scavino as a means through which the
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President “communicates directly with you, the American people!”
Stip. ¶ 37 (alterations incorporated).

And finally, there can be

no serious suggestion that the interactive space is incompatible
with expressive activity: rather, Twitter as a platform is designed
to allow users “to interact with other Twitter users in relation
to [their tweets],” Stip. ¶ 13, and users can use Twitter to
“petition their elected representatives and otherwise engage with
them in a direct manner,” Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735.

The

interactivity of Twitter is one of its defining characteristics,
and

indeed,

President’s

tweets

accommodates a substantial body of expressive activity.

Stip.

¶¶ 41-43.

the

interactive

space

of

the

Taking these factors together, we conclude that the

interactive space of a tweet from the @realDonaldTrump account
constitutes a designated public forum.
D.

Viewpoint Discrimination

“[T]he extent to which the Government can control access
depends on the nature of the relevant forum,” Cornelius, 473 U.S.
at 800, so we next consider whether the blocking of the individual
plaintiffs

is

permissible

in

a

designated

public

forum.

“Regulation of [a designated public forum] is subject to the same
limitations as that governing a traditional public forum” -restriction are permissible “only if they are narrowly drawn to
achieve a compelling state interest.”

ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 678-

79; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
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specific nature of the forum, however, “[v]iewpoint discrimination
. . .

is

presumed

impermissible

when

directed

otherwise within the forum’s limitations.”

against

speech

Rosenberger, 515 U.S.

at 830; see also Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (“When government
creates such a forum, in either a literal or ‘metaphysical’ sense,
some

content-

and

speaker-based

restrictions

may

be

allowed.

However, even in such cases, what we have termed ‘viewpoint
discrimination’

is

forbidden.”

(citations

omitted)

(quoting

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830-31)).
Here, the individual plaintiffs were indisputably blocked as
a result of viewpoint discrimination.

The record establishes that

“[s]hortly after the Individual Plaintiffs posted the tweets . . .
in which they criticized the President or his policies, the
President blocked each of the Individual Plaintiffs,” Stip. ¶ 53,
and defendants do “not contest Plaintiffs’ allegation that the
Individual Plaintiffs were blocked from the President’s Twitter
account

because

the

Individual

Plaintiffs

criticized the President or his policies.”
continued

exclusion

of

the

individual

posted

tweets

that

Stip. at 1.

The

plaintiffs

based

on

viewpoint is, therefore, impermissible under the First Amendment.22

22 Even if the interactive space associated with the content of a tweet
constituted a nonpublic forum, the exclusion of the individual plaintiffs would
not withstand First Amendment scrutiny. “Control over access to a nonpublic
forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the
distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum
and are viewpoint neutral.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806. The blocking of the
individual plaintiffs, which resulted from their “tweets that criticized the
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Defendants

contend

that

the

blocking

of

the

individual

plaintiffs is permissible because the President retains a personal
First Amendment interest in choosing the people with whom he
associates and retains the right not to engage with (i.e., the
right to ignore) the individual plaintiffs.

Further, they argue,

the individual plaintiffs have no right to be heard by a government
audience

and

government.
of

law,

no

right

to

have

their

views

amplified

by

the

While those propositions are accurate as statements

they

nonetheless

do

not

render

the

blocking

of

the

individual plaintiffs constitutionally permissible.
To be clear, a public official does not lose his First
Amendment rights upon taking office.
547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006).

Cf. Garcetti v. Ceballos,

“The interest of the public in hearing

all sides of a public issue,” an interest that the First Amendment
seeks to protect, “is hardly advanced by extending more protection
to citizen-critics than to [public officials].”
385 U.S. 116, 136 (1966).

Bond v. Floyd,

That is, no set of plaintiffs could

credibly argue that they “have a constitutional right to prevent
[government officials] from exercising their own rights” under the
First Amendment.
Cir. 1999).

X-Men Sec., Inc. v. Pataki, 196 F.3d 56, 70 (2d

Further, “[n]othing in the First Amendment or in [the

Supreme] Court’s case law interpreting it suggests that the rights

President or his policies,” Stip. at 1, is not viewpoint-neutral, and is
therefore impermissible “regardless of how the property is categorized under
forum doctrine,” Wandering Dago, 879 F.3d at 39.
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to speak, associate, and petition require government policymakers
to listen or respond to individuals’ communications on public
issues.”

Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S.

271,

(1984).

285

government’s

No

First

“challenged

Amendment

conduct

is

harm

simply

arises
to

when

ignore

a
the

[speaker],” as the Supreme Court has affirmed that “[t]hat it is
free to do.”

Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441

U.S. 463, 466 (1979) (per curiam). Stated otherwise, “[a] person’s
right to speak is not infringed when government simply ignores
that person while listening to others,” or when the government
“amplifies” the voice of one speaker over those of others.
State Bd., 465 U.S. at 288.

Minn.

Nonetheless, when the government goes

beyond merely amplifying certain speakers’ voices and not engaging
with others, and actively restricts “the right of an individual to
speak freely [and] to advocate ideas,” it treads into territory
proscribed by the First Amendment.

Id. at 286 (quoting Smith, 441

U.S. at 464).
Consideration

of

Twitter’s

two

features

for

limiting

interaction between users -- muting and blocking -- is useful in
addressing the potentially conflicting constitutional prerogatives
of the government as listener on the one hand and of speakers on
the other, as muting and blocking differ in relevant ways.

As

Twitter explains, “[m]ut[ing] is a feature that allows [a user] to
remove an account’s Tweets from [the user’s] timeline without
65
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unfollowing or blocking that account.”

How to Mute.

For muted

accounts that the muting account does not follow on Twitter,
“[r]eplies and mentions will not appear” in the muting account’s
notifications, nor will mentions by the muted account.

Id.

That

is, muting allows a user to ignore an account with which the user
does not wish to engage.

The muted account may still attempt to

engage with the muting account -- it may still reply to tweets
sent by the muting account, among other capabilities -- but the
muting account generally will not see these replies.23

Critically,

however, the muted account may still reply directly to the muting
account, even if that reply is ultimately ignored.
Blocking, by contrast, goes further.

The blocking user “will

not see any tweets posted by the blocked user” just as a muting
user would not see tweets posted by a muted user, but whereas
muting preserves the muted account’s ability to reply to a tweet
sent by the muting account, blocking precludes the blocked user
from

“see[ing]

entirely.

or

reply[ing]

Stip. ¶ 28.

to

the

blocking

user’s

tweets”

The elimination of the blocked user’s

ability to reply directly is more than the blocking user merely
ignoring the blocked user; it is the blocking user limiting the
blocked user’s right to speak in a discrete, measurable way.

23 These replies will appear in the muting account’s notifications if the
muting account follows the muted account. Of course, the fact that one account
follows a second account strongly indicates some desire by the first user to
engage with the second user. Stip. ¶ 19.
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Muting equally vindicates the President’s right to ignore certain
speakers and to selectively amplify the voices of certain others
but -- unlike blocking -- does so without restricting the right of
the ignored to speak.
Given these differing consequences of muting and blocking, we
find unpersuasive defendants’ contention that a public official’s
muting and blocking are equivalent, and equally constitutional,
means of choosing not to engage with his constituents.

Implicit

in this argument is the assumption that a reply to a tweet is
directed only at the user who sent the tweet being replied to.
Were that so, defendants would be correct in that there is no
difference between the inability to send a direct reply (as with
blocking) and the inability to have that direct reply heard by the
sender of the initial tweet being responded to (as with muting).
But this assumption is not supported in the record: a reply is
visible to others, Stip. ¶ 22, and may itself be replied to by
other users, Stip. ¶¶ 57-58.

The audience for a reply extends

more broadly than the sender of the tweet being replied to, and
blocking restricts the ability of a blocked user to speak to that
audience.

While the right to speak and the right to be heard may

be functionally identical if the speech is directed at only one
listener, they are not when there is more than one.
In sum, we conclude that the blocking of the individual
plaintiffs as a result of the political views they have expressed
67
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is

impermissible

under

the

First

Amendment.

While

we

must

recognize, and are sensitive to, the President’s personal First
Amendment rights, he cannot exercise those rights in a way that
infringes the corresponding First Amendment rights of those who
have criticized him.
To

be

sure,

we

do

not

suggest

that

the

impact

on

the

individual plaintiffs (and, by extension, on the Knight Institute)
is of the highest magnitude.

It is not.

But the law is also

clear: the First Amendment recognizes, and protects against, even
de minimis harms. See Six Star Holdings, LLC v. City of Milwaukee,
821 F.3d 795, 805 (7th Cir. 2016) (rejecting an argument of “de
minimis” First Amendment harm and approving an award of nominal
damages); Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1221 (10th Cir. 2006)
(similar); KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 465 F.3d 1256,
1261 (11th Cir. 2006) (similar); Risdal v. Halford, 209 F.3d 1071,
1072 (8th Cir. 2000) (similar); cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
373 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The loss of First Amendment
freedoms,

for

even

minimal

periods

of

time,

unquestionably

constitutes irreparable injury.”); N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v.
Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 2013) (same).

Thus, even though

defendants are entirely correct in contending that the individual
plaintiffs may continue to access the content of the President’s
tweets, Stip. ¶¶ 55-56, and that they may tweet replies to earlier
replies to the President’s tweets, Stip. ¶¶ 57-58, the blocking of
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the individual plaintiffs has the discrete impact of preventing
them from interacting directly with the President’s tweets, Stip.
¶ 54, thereby restricting a real, albeit narrow, slice of speech.
No more is needed to violate the Constitution.
IV.

Relief
As plaintiffs seek both injunctive and declaratory relief, we

turn, then, to the question of the proper remedy to be afforded
here.24

Defendants suggest that we categorically lack authority

to enjoin the President, a proposition we do not accept.

Stated

simply, “separation-of-powers doctrine does not bar every exercise
of jurisdiction over the President of the United States.”
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753-54 (1982).

Nixon

Rather, “it is . . .

settled that the President is subject to judicial process in
appropriate circumstances,” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703
(1997), and the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the notion of
“an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from
judicial process under all circumstances,” id. at 704 (quoting
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974)).

24 We do not analyze separately the argument that the blocking of the
individual plaintiffs violates their right “to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances” under the First Amendment’s Petition Clause. The First
Amendment right to speech and petition “are inseparable,” and generally “there
is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection” to one over
the other. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985). “There may arise cases
where the special concerns of the Petition Clause would provide a sound basis
for a distinct analysis,” Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 389
(2011), but this case does not present one of them.
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However,

“a

court,

before

exercising

jurisdiction,

must

balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be served
against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of
the Executive Branch.”

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 754.

A

four-Justice plurality of the Supreme Court has explained that
while “in general ‘this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to
enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties,’”
Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 475, 499 (1866), “left
open the question whether the President might be subject to a
judicial

injunction

‘ministerial’ duty.”

requiring

the

performance

of

a

purely

Franklin, 505 U.S. at 802–03 (plurality

opinion) (quoting Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) at 499).
Franklin’s acknowledgment of the door left open by Mississippi v.
Johnson is consistent with the balancing approach articulated by
the Court in Nixon v. Fitzgerald: an injunction directing the
performance of a ministerial duty represents a minimal “danger[]
of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive
Branch”

as

compared

to

imposition

posed

by

the

injunction

considered in Mississippi v. Johnson.
In
presented

this
by

case,
an

the

intrusion

injunction

on

directing

individual plaintiffs would be minimal.

executive
the

prerogative

unblocking

of

the

Any such injunction would

not direct the President to execute the laws in a certain way, nor
would it mandate that he pursue any substantive policy ends.
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accepting that the President’s blocking decisions in the first
instance are discretionary, the duty to unblock -- following a
holding that such blocking was unconstitutional -- would not be,
as the President must act in compliance with the Constitution and
other laws.

Cf. Swan, 100 F.3d at 977 (“[The asserted statutory]

duty, if it exists, is ministerial and not discretionary, for the
President is bound to abide by the requirements of duly enacted
and otherwise constitutional statutes.”).

That is, the correction

of

closely

an

unconstitutional

act

far

more

resembles

the

performance of “a mere ministerial duty,” where “nothing [is] left
to discretion,” than the performance of a “purely executive and
political” duty requiring the exercise of discretion vested in the
President.

Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) at 499.

An

injunction directing the unblocking of the individual plaintiffs
would therefore impose a duty that far more closely resembles the
duties considered in Swan, see 100 F.3d at 977-78, and in National
Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 608 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (defining a “ministerial duty” as “a simple, definite duty,
arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed
by

law”),

than

the

highly

Mississippi v. Johnson.

discretionary

duty

considered

in

The ways to faithfully execute the

Reconstruction Acts passed by Congress following the Civil War are
uncountable in number, but “[t]he law require[s] the performance
of a single specific act” here.

Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S.
71

SPA.71

Case
Case
1:17-cv-05205-NRB
18-1691, DocumentDocument
25, 08/07/2018,
72 Filed
2362018,
05/23/18
Page121
Page of
72124
of 75

(4 Wall) at 499.

No government official, after all, possesses the

discretion to act unconstitutionally.
We need not, however, ultimately resolve the question of
whether injunctive relief may be awarded against the President, as
injunctive
remain

relief

directed

available.

Government’s

parade

interference
directing

While

in
the

of

executive
President

at

Scavino

we

find

to

declaratory

entirely

horribles
affairs

and

unpersuasive

regarding

presented

comply

relief

by

with

the
an

the

judicial
injunction

constitutional

restrictions, we nonetheless recognize that “[a]s a matter of
comity, courts should normally direct legal process to a lower
Executive official even though the effect of the process is to
restrain or compel the President.”

Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700,

709 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam). Subordinate officials
may, of course, be enjoined by the courts.
Sheet

&

Tube

Co.

v.

Sawyer,

343

U.S.

See, e.g., Youngstown
579,

584,

588

(1952)

(affirming an injunction directed at the Secretary of Commerce);
see also, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857
F.3d 554, 605 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (vacating an injunction only to
the extent it was directed at the President), vacated and remanded,
138 S. Ct. 353 (2017).

Injunctive relief directed against Scavino

would certainly implicate fewer separation-of-powers concerns, see
Franklin, 505 U.S. at 802-03, but we also recognize that “the
strong remedy of injunction,” Rivera-Puig v. Garcia-Rosario, 983
72
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F.2d 311, 316 (1st Cir. 1992), should be sparingly employed even
when those constitutional concerns are not present; see, e.g.,
Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714-15 (2010) (plurality opinion).
Accordingly, though we conclude that injunctive relief may be
awarded in this case -- at minimum, against Scavino -- we decline
to do so at this time because declaratory relief is likely to
achieve the same purpose.

The Supreme Court has directed that we

should “assume it is substantially likely that the President and
other executive . . . officials would abide by an authoritative
interpretation of [a] . . . constitutional provision,” Franklin,
505 U.S. at 803 (plurality opinion); see Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S.
at 464 (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 803 (plurality opinion)); see
also Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82, 96 (2d Cir. 2017); Made
in the USA, 242 F.3d at 1310; Swan, 100 F.3d at 980; L.A. Cty. Bar
Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 701 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Were this court
to issue the requested declaration, we must assume that it is
substantially likely that [government officials] . . . would abide
by our authoritative determination.”), and there is simply no
reason to depart from this assumption at this time.

Declaratory

judgment is appropriate under the factors that the Second Circuit
directs us to consider, see Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods Ltd., 346
F.3d 357, 359-60 (2d Cir. 2003), and a declaration will therefore
issue:

the

blocking

of

the

individual

73

SPA.73

plaintiffs

from

the

Case
Case
1:17-cv-05205-NRB
18-1691, DocumentDocument
25, 08/07/2018,
72 Filed
2362018,
05/23/18
Page123
Page of
74124
of 75

@realDonaldTrump account because of their expressed political
views violates the First Amendment.
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), and we have held that the President’s
blocking of the individual plaintiffs is unconstitutional under
the First Amendment.

Because no government official is above the

law and because all government officials are presumed to follow
the law once the judiciary has said what the law is, we must assume
that the President and Scavino will remedy the blocking we have
held to be unconstitutional.
V.

Conclusion
We conclude that we have jurisdiction to entertain this

dispute.

Plaintiffs have established legal injuries that are

traceable to the conduct of the President and Daniel Scavino and,
despite defendants’ suggestions to the contrary, their injuries
are redressable by a favorable judicial declaration.

Plaintiffs

lack standing, however, to sue Sarah Huckabee Sanders, who is
dismissed as a defendant.

Hope Hicks is also dismissed as a

defendant,

her

in

light

of

resignation

as

White

House

Communications Director.
Turning to the merits of plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim,
we hold that the speech in which they seek to engage is protected
by the First Amendment and that the President and Scavino exert
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governmental control over certain aspects of the @realDonaldTrump
account,

including the interactive space of the tweets sent from

the account.
under

the

That i~teractive space is susceptible to analysis

Supreme

Court's

forum

doctrines,

characterized as a designated public forum.

and

is

properly

The viewpoint-based

exclusion of the individual plaintiffs from that designated public
forum 1s proscribed by the First Amendment and cannot be justified
by the President's personal First Amendment interests.
In sum, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in
part and denied 1n part, and plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary
judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
Court

is

directed

to

terminate

the

motions

The Clerk of the
pending

at

docket

entries 34 and 42.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

New York, New York
May 23, 2018

L~t2,ct£~

NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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